NARTEY-TOKOLI AND OTHERS v. VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO LTD (NO. 3)

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS JSC.

On 8 March 1990 the Supreme Court delivered its decision in the above appeal: (see [1989-90] 2 GLR 341, SC). Before 26 November 1987 that decision would have conclusively ended this protracted matter. The significance of 26 November 1987 is that it marked the advent of an epoch-making decision: the ruling in Fosuhene v Pomaa [1987-88] 2 GLR 105, SC which held that this Court had power to review its own judgments and consequently formulated tests for the institution of the review jurisdiction. Since then, a number of applications for review have been determined by this court. The synthesised ratio for success is the existence of exceptional circumstances negating the soundness of a decision and compelling its vacation to obviate a miscarriage of justice.

The review jurisdiction, it has been emphasised ad nauseam, is not another avenue for appeal or a forum for canvassing lost causes. Unfortunately, if the statistics are any guide, this appears to be the erroneous perception of a number of litigants. Exceptional circumstances have not been defined and although the parameters are loosely indicated, and the categories have neither been listed nor closed, they are not wide enough to admit inappropriate and undeserving cases. The absence of a rigid definition notwithstanding, what is exceptional can hardly escape notice. A few examples have been given in previous rulings of this court and need no reiteration.

This court normally would resist the temptation of being drawn into expatiating on its judgment with explanations or justifications. This inhibition cannot, however, extend over mischievous or wilful misreading of all important precedent upon which a decision rests.

In Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board v Agbettoh [1984-86] 1 GLR 122, CA, the court made pronouncements which ensured that statutorily protected contracts would retain their protection under the aegis of the court's jurisdiction. This decision in certain areas, deviated from the beaten track of master and servant contractual relationships well-known in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The applicants herein aridly dismiss the Agbettoh decision as affording no legal solace. That decision is repudiated as: "not founded on any principle known to the law", and occasioning "a fundamental error."

If that were the case, one wonders why an exercise for a review has been embarked upon at all. For it was upon the su