NARTEY-TOKOLI AND OTHERS v. VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. (NO.2)
1989
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- SOWAH C.J.
- FRANCOIS
- AMUA-SEKYI JJ.S.C.
- OSEI-HWERE
- LAMPTEY JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
1989
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Chief Justice Sowah delivered the Supreme Court’s ruling in a matter brought by 463 former employees of Volta Aluminium Co. Ltd. seeking reliefs connected with the termination of their engagements. After an adverse High Court outcome, the employees appealed to the Court of Appeal, which characterized the appeal as partially successful and awarded costs. Dissatisfied with certain orders and pronouncements, they sought to test the viability of that judgment in the Supreme Court, raising questions about whether leave to appeal under section 3(2) of the Courts Act (as inserted by PNDCL 191) was required and whether an extension of time should be granted. Rejecting the company’s argument that affirmed issues amounted to a confirmed decision, the Court emphasized that a decision is an indivisible judgment and that section 3(2) applies only after successive defeats. Concluding that the employees were partially successful, the Court held they could appeal as of right and granted a seven-day extension of time. Application granted.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH C.J.
Sowah C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. The plaintiffs, 463 of them, sued the Volta Aluminium Co. Ltd. in a single action for reliefs connected with the termination of their engagement with the company. We make no comment on the form of the writ. Dissatisfied with the result of the action at the High Court, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court described this second attempt as “partially successful” and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.
Dissatisfied further with certain orders and pronouncements of the Court of Appeal, the plaintiffs have sought to test the viability of that [p.340] decision at the Supreme Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered on 20 December 1988. The plaintiffs claimed that they received a copy of the judgment on 31 January 1989 and being caught on the horns of a dilemma as to their rights of appeal sought unsuccessfully for an extension of time to appeal. This course was predicated on a diffidence as to the nature of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, whether final or interlocutory, and as to the legal construction of the Courts (Amendment) Law, 1987 (P.N.D.C.L. 191) amending by insertion of a new section 3 into the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372).
On the first issue, the plaintiffs equate the refusal by the Court of Appeal to extend time with a refusal to grant leave, the statutory two weeks for filing interlocutory appeals having expired; they urge special circumstances for the grant of the relief of extension by this court. The hurdle grounded on P.N.D.C.L. 191 amending Act 372 involves the true construction of the rights of appeal accorded a litigant who has failed in the court below. Four stated categories are set out in section 3 (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d). Section 3 (2) which is the relevant provision in this matter is as follows:
"(2) Where a decision of the Court of Appeal confirms the decision appealed against from a lower court, an appeal shall lie against such decision of the Court of Appeal which may on its own motion or on an oral application made by the aggrieved party decide whether or not to grant such leave, and where the Court of Appeal refuses to grant the leave to appeal the aggrieved party may apply to the Supreme Court for such leave."
Counsel for the defendant-company contends that the plaintiffs were unsuccessful on a number of issues determined by the trial High Court. When these matters were re-agitated before the Court of Appeal, t