NANA ABINA KURANGYIWA, Queen Mother oF WASSAW FIASI v. A. C. DUNCAN-JOHNSTONE And Others
1936
DIVISIONAL COURT (COLONIAL)
GHANA
CORAM
- DOORLy, J
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
1936
DIVISIONAL COURT (COLONIAL)
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
On appeal by the original private prosecutrix from a District Magistrates order in Tarkwa (Sekondi) imposing approximately 76 in costs after discharging numerous high-ranking defendants due to her non-appearance, Justice Doorly addressed the interplay between sections 156(1) and 132(2) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance. The defendants included the Commissioner of the Province, District Commissioners, the Commissioner of Police, and the Omanhene of Wassaw Fiase, all charged with rioting in their official capacities. Doorly held that although a discharge may occur after adjournment without prior evidence, costs against a private prosecutor under section 156(1) may only be awarded when the conditions of section 132(2) are metspecifically, when there are no reasonable grounds for the complaint. Given the prosecutrixs absence, lack of evidence, and the implausibility of the charge, the magistrate was entitled to find no reasonable grounds and award costs. However, applying the Interpretation Ordinance, Doorly limited total costs to 25 in the aggregate.
The following judgment was delivered: DOORLy, J.
This is an appeal taken by the original prosecutrix against the order of the District Magistrate, Sekondi, sitting at Tarkwa on the 11th December, 1935, that she pay various sums of money as the costs of those of the defendants who were present at the time after an order for the discharge of the defendants had been made on the ground of the absence of the prosecutrix at the time, date, and place fixed for the trial of the case.
The order of discharge was made under section 156(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, and the order as to costs, which amounted to some £76 in the aggregate, was applied for and purported to be made under section 132(2) of the same law, follows:-
"It shall be lawful for any Court that acquits or discharges a person accused of an offence, if the prosecution for such offence was originally instituted on a summons or warrant issued by a Court on the complaint of a private prosecutor, to order such private prosecutor to pay to the accused such reasonable costs as to such Court may seem fit.
"Provided that such costs shall not exceed fifty pounds in the case of an acquittal or discharge by the Supreme Court or twenty-five pounds in the case of an acquittal or discharge by a Magistrate's Court.
"Provided further that no such order shall be made if the Judge or Magistrate shall consider that the private prosecutor had reasonable grounds for making his complaint."
The first ground of appeal is that the order for costs against the prosecutrix under that subsection is bad, inasmuch as the learned Magistrate, having heard no evidence in the case, was not in a position to form an opinion whether or not there were reasonable grounds for the complaint of the prosecutrix.
It was submitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that section 132(2) could only apply in a case when, from the opening by the prosecutor, matter had been produced to the Court on which it could form an opinion as to the nature of the prosecution.
The learned Solicitor appearing for the first four respondents drew attention to the provisions of section 156(1) and argued that costs could and should have been awarded under that subsection, and that section 132(2) had no bearing on the matter.
As there is some difficulty in the interpretation of these two subsections, I reserved judgment in order further to consider their implications.
1. Section 156(1) reads as follows:-
"If at the time or place to which the heari