JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
The respondent (who was the plaintiff in the district court action) in this case sued the appellant in the district court grade I on 6 January 1970 claiming N¢653.40 being arrears of rent from January 1968 up to December 1969 and an order of the court ejecting the appellant from the premises which he had apparently rented to her. The writ of summons was served on the appellant on 16 January 1970 and the return day was 21 January 1970. The summons served was accompanied by an affidavit setting out the particulars of the demand and this clearly gave the appellant reasonably sufficient information as to the details of the respondent's claim, in accordance with Order 5, r. 1 of the Second Schedule to the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1959 Rev.), the rules governing civil procedure in the district courts.
On the next day after receiving the summons and the particulars aforesaid the appellant filed an affidavit denying the claim. It is not clear why this was done except perhaps that having received an affidavit from the respondent the appellant must have thought she was obliged to file one.
On the return day, 21 January 1970, the hearing was by the agreement of the parties adjourned to 29 January 1970. Only the appellant was represented by counsel. On the adjourned date, 29 January 1970, counsel for the appellant asked for a further adjournment to study the case and although the respondent appeared in person, he unsuccessfully resisted the application and the hearing was again adjourned to 4 February 1970. N¢4.00 costs were awarded against the appellant.
On 2 February 1970 two days before the adjourned date the appellant filed what was headed, "an amended statement of defence," in which she purported to answer the averments contained in the respondent's affidavit of 6 January 1970. The record does not show any statement of claim apart from the particulars of claim in the writ and there was also no statement of defence so that in this so-called amended statement of defence, the affidavit of the appellant is clearly wrongly described as a statement of defence. It does not seem to me that it was necessary for the appellant to file an affidavit or indeed a so-called statement of defence. It is not clear why the appellant, who was represented by counsel, adopted this procedure. In my view the procedure adopted by the appellant and acquiesced in by the district magistrate is rather very irregular. The hearing of suits in the district courts is su
