JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.S.C.
Amua-Sekyi J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the majority. On 4 May 1988, the High Court, Cape Coast gave judgment for the plaintiff, Kojo Mensah, for: (a) declaration that Accra Standfast Football Club (Standfast) are not qualified to play in the first division of the 1988-89 National Football League; that Cape Coast Venomous Vipers Football Club (Vipers) are qualified to play in the said division of the league; that the decisions of the disciplinary committee and the appeals committee of the defendant, Ghana Football Association, to [p.4] the contrary are null and void; (b) an order setting aside the decision of the defendants confirming that of the appeal committee; (c) an injunction restraining the defendants and the National Sports Council from proceeding with the current league without the participation of Vipers; and (d) an injunction restraining Standfast from participating in the said league. Being dissatisfied with this judgment, the defendants lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal and applied to the High Court, Cape Coast for a stay of execution pending the final determination of the appeal. The application was refused, principally on the ground that the judgment was non-executable. The defendants repeated their application before the Court of Appeal which granted a stay on the main ground that the appeal was likely to succeed. This appeal is from the decision of the Court of Appeal.
The application to the High Court and the Court of Appeal were brought under rule 27 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218) as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1975 (L.I. 1002), and rule 28 of the said rules, as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618). Rule 27 (1) reads:
"27. (1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed except where the court below or the Court otherwise orders—
(a) in the case of the Court below, upon application made already or by motion on notice to it, and
(b) in the case of the Court, upon application made to it by motion on notice, and except as aforesaid no intermediate act or proceeding shall be invalidated."
And rule 28, also, reads:
"28. Subject to the provisions of these Rules and to any other enactment, where under any enactment an application may be made either to the Court below or to the Court, it shall be made in the first instance to the Court below, but if the Court below r
