MECHANICAL LLOYD ASSEMBLY PLANT LTD v. NARTEY
July 19, 1988
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- ADADE
- TAYLOR
- FRANCOIS
- WUAKU
- AMUA-SEKYI JJ.S.C
Areas of Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
- Civil Procedure
- Evidence Law
- Tort Law
July 19, 1988
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd. sought the Supreme Court of Ghana’s review of its 19 May 1988 judgment that had, by a 3–2 split, reinstated Philip Tetteh Nartey’s title, possession, injunction, damages, and costs concerning land at Frafraha. The majority opinions by Justices Adade, Taylor, and Wuaku held that the review jurisdiction is exceptional and cannot be used to re‑argue an appeal; the applicants showed no fundamental error or miscarriage of justice. They emphasized that Nartey had proved grant and prior possession through the Agbawe family and that Mechanical Lloyd’s reliance on an unpleaded licence from the late R.A. Darko and defective documentation lacking ministerial concurrence, registration, and stamping could not justify entry. Dissenting, Justices Francois and Amua‑Sekyi would have allowed review, faulting panel composition and the majority’s treatment of pleadings and title.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
This is an application by the defendants herein, Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd., asking this court to review its decision given on 19 May 1988 (see [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 314, S.C.). In that decision the court gave judgment for the plaintiff (Francois and Amua Sekyi JJ.S.C. dissenting) for:
(a) a declaration of title to a piece of land at Frafraha;
(b) recovery of possession of the said land;
(c) an injunction to restrain the defendants, e.t.c. from interfering with the land.
The court also awarded the plaintiff ¢200,000 damages, and gave him ¢50,000 costs in this court, and ¢25,000 each in the Court of Appeal and the High Court.
The defendants say that the judgment is wrong; it should be reviewed and reversed in their favour. As soon as arguments closed on 29 June 1988, I had no doubt in my own mind that this application must fail. I could immediately have pronounced my decision there and then, at best reserving my reasons. The more I listened to Mr. Joe Reindorf, counsel for the defendants-applicants, the more convinced I became that he was not arguing an application for a review; he was merely re-arguing the appeal which had been disposed of, trying to put the best face possible on a rather hopeless case.
Let me say at once that, for all I know, virtually every judgment on this earth, arrived at as a result of evidence gathered from several sources, can be criticised. A Privy Council judgment put in the hands of any lawyer, along with the evidence grounding it, can be criticised in the same way as a High Court judgment can be. A person who has lost a case will almost instinctively feel that the judgment must be wrong. And why not? If he had won, the decision would be right; so if he lost, how could the court be right? But the mere fact that a judgment can be criticised is no ground for asking that it should be reviewed. The review jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction to be exercised in exceptional circumstances. It is not an appellate jurisdiction. It is a kind of jurisdiction held in reserve, to be prayed in aid in the exceptional [p.604] situation where a fundamental and basic error may have inadvertently been committed by the court, which error must have occasioned a gross miscarriage of justice. The review jurisdiction is not intended as a try-on by a party after losing an appeal; nor is it an automatic next step from an appeal; neither is it meant to be resorted to as an emotional reaction to an unfavourable