LEVANDOWSKY AND ANOTHER v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL
1970
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- ABBAN J
Areas of Law
- Company Law
- Partnership Law
- Civil Procedure
1970
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The court overruled the preliminary objections, holding that the plaintiffs did not carry on business in Ghana within the meaning of section 4 of Act 152 and thus were not required to be registered under the act to enforce their rights.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.
On 11 August 1970, when the court was about to hear the application of the plaintiffs- judgment creditors (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) asking for leave to go into execution, the learned Solicitor-General, Dr. S. K. B. Asante who appeared as counsel for the defendants-judgment (debtors hereinafter referred to as the defendants) raised very important preliminary objections. The arguments put forward in support of these objections are also very interesting and I will like to discuss the same in full. His objections, in a nutshell, were that the plaintiffs not having been registered as a company under the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) or not having been registered as a firm of partnership under the Incorporated Private Partnerships Act, 1962 (Act 152) are hindered or prevented by what the learned counsel described as "fundamental legal impediments" from instituting any legal proceedings (including the present application) for the purpose of enforcing any of the rights which the plaintiffs may have under the agreement dated 13 March 1962. I must remark that a copy of the said agreement mentioned herein was never filed, either in the present application or in the substantive case which is now on appeal.
However, the learned Solicitor-General maintained that the plaintiffs never registered their company or firm and they have still not done so. They have therefore defaulted in complying with sections 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Act 152 and, consequently, they are caught by section 9 (1) (b) of Act 152. Learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiffs, if they are a company, are similarly caught by section 313 (2) of Act 179. Counsel contended that so long as the plaintiffs continued being in default in not registering their company or firm under any of the two acts referred to herein, they are not competent to institute any action or legal proceedings to enforce the judgment. The learned Solicitor-General also referred to Order 48A, r. 1 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A/54), and argued that the plaintiffs, by instituting their action in this court and obtaining judgment in respect thereof, must be taken to have carried on business in Ghana and they cannot now be heard to say that they never carried on business in this country.
[p.40]
It must be said at this stage that Order 48A, r. 1 only lays down the procedure as to how any firm carrying on business in this country can sue and be sued. It