The following ruling was given: Howes, J.
Mr. Christian has raised a preliminary objection that the joinder of 12 persons in a suit of this nature, viz.: for damages for assault and battery and false imprisonment is wrong and should not be allowed.
He has referred me to several English cases upon the interpretation of Order XVI, rule 1, of the English Supreme Court Rules before that rule was amended in 1896, and in particular to the decision of the House of Lords in Smurthwaite v. Hannay, 1894, Appeal Cases, 494, in which it was held that where the causes of action of several plaintiffs were separate and distinct they could not be joined in one action under Order XVI or otherwise.
It was this case that led to the amendment of the English Order XVI, rule 1, which before 1896 purported to deal merely with the practice to an action and had no reference to the joinder of several causes of action.
Formerly in England, where the wrong done to one was no wrong to the other, as in the case of false imprisonment or assault and battery, where what one man suffers is altogether different from the injury that accrues to another from the same cause, separate actions had to be brought; but between 1883 and 1896, under the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order XVI, all persons in whom the right to any relief claimed was alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally or in the alternative, were allowed to be joined as plaintiffs. In 1896 the scope of the English rule was considerably extended; and now this right of joinder includes not only parties, but joinder of causes of action.
With the English rule, however, I am not concerned, as in this Colony the point raised is governed by Schedule 2 to the Supreme Court Ordinance, Order 3, rule 2, which has no resemblance to the English Order XVI, rule 1, and reads:-
“ 2. Where a person has jointly with other persons a ground for instituting a suit, all these persons ought ordinarily to be made parties to the suit."
It is certainly a very sketchy rule, but I think its meaning and intention are clear.
It becomes a question of what is intended by "jointly"; and with regard to this word, I must interpret it in its ordinary meaning, viz., "in a joint manner," "together," "unitedly" or "in concert." There is no restriction put upon the kind of suit to which the rule is to apply. Provided that one person "has a ground of instituting" a suit jointly with others, all the other persons ought ordinarily to be made parties; which
