GH - KWAME DARKO AND KWESI OTU DARKO

The judgment of the Court, which consisted of Hall, Acting

C.J. the Gold Coast Colony, MicheJin and Sawrey-Cookson, J.J., was delivered by Hall, Acting c.J. as follows :-

The appellants in this case were convicted on two counts of the murder of Yerima Kotokoli and Mama Kotokoli at Asamangkese on the night of 5th May, 1931. Although the trial should, according to law, have taken place in the Eastern Province, yet, on the application of counsel for the accused and with the concurrence of Counsel representing the Crown, I, as Acting Chief Justice, transferred the case to a special Divisional Court at Sekondi, it being alleged that it was unlikely that a fair trial could be obtained at Accra on the ground of local prejudice.

At the opening of the case at Sekondi the Acting SolicitorGeneral, who represented the Crown, caused a large number of jurymen to " stand by," and it was contended by Counsel for the appellants before this Court that in view of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance no such right existed in the Crown.

In our view it is clear that the Crown still retains this right. Under section 14 of the Supreme Court Ordinance the Common Law of England is in force within the jurisdiction ()f this Court. It is true that as regards practice and procedure the Supreme Court is to follow the Criminal Procedure Ordinance so far as that Ordinance indicates what the practice and procedure to be followed is, and this brings me to sections 124 and 125 of that Ordinance. Section 124 forbids any challenge to the array and allows three peremptory challenges to an accused person, whilst section 125 deals with challenges for cause.

Turning to the 28th Edition of Archbold's Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice it is found that at Common Law the Crown might challenge peremptorily any number of jurors.

This power was taken away by 33 Edward I, Cap. 4, which was subsequently repealed by 6 Geo. IV, Cap. 50, but the later statute re-asserted that the Crown could only challenge for cause ...

It is clear, however, from the cases of R. v. Parry, 7 C. and P. page 836, and R. v. Geach, 9 C. and P. page 499, that the old right of "standing by" still remained with the Crown despite the afore-mentioned Statutes.

In effect, therefore, the relevant sections in our Procedure Ordinance contain similar provisions to the English Law, and since our Ordinances are as silent as the English Statutes in regard to the right of the Crown to " stand by" it would seem that

The judgment of the Court, which consisted of Hall, Acting

C.J. the Gold Coast Colony, MicheJin and Sawrey-Cookson, J.J., was delivered by Hall, Acting c.J. as follows :-

Turning to the 28th Edition of Archbold's Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice it is found that at Common Law the Crown might challenge peremptorily any number of jurors.

This power was taken away by 33 Edward I, Cap. 4, which was subsequently repealed by 6 Geo. IV, Cap. 50, but the later statute re-asserted that the Crown could only challenge for cause ...

KWAME DARKO AND KWESI OTU DARKO

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