JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.
The appellant was charged with conspiracy to steal under sections 23 (1) and 124 (10) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and stealing under section 124 (1) of the same Act.
The facts stated by the prosecuting officer in support of these charges were that: on 27 May 1977, the appellant and one other, now at large went to a nursery and stole two basket-fuls of garden-egg seedlings. On their return from the nursery, the one at large sold his share to the appellant. The appellant, who is a driver, carried the two baskets of seedlings in his vehicle from the village, which by some accident of fate is named Nokwareasa, to Ejura. The complainant, who had received some information relating to his missing seedlings, followed the tracks of the appellant to Ejura where, on finding the appellant in possession of the seedlings, he demanded to know the origins of the seedlings. The appellant [p.281] told him that he bought both baskets from a passenger who brought the seedlings to his vehicle. Upon a report being made to the police, the appellant and the man from whom he alleged he bought the seedlings were arrested and charged with the offences above stated.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and was, on 30 May 1977, convicted on his own plea and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment on each charge without the option of a fine. The sentences were, however, ordered to run concurrently. It is against this conviction and sentence that the appellant now appeals.
By section 199 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30):
"(4) Where the accused pleads guilty but adds words indicating that he may have a defence or so indicates in answer to the Court, the Court shall enter a plea of not guilty and record it as having been entered by order of the Court."
In the instant case, however, the record does not disclose that when the appellant pleaded guilty he indicated to the court that he may have a defence in answer to the charge. It was the prosecutor himself who, in furnishing the court with the facts on which the prosecution relies, stated that the appellant, when interrogated, had informed them that he bought the seedlings without the knowledge that they were stolen. I ask myself: Is the position at law any different if the indication that the accused may have a defence comes, not from the accused, but from the prosecutor?
It seems to me that if justice be the objective of courts of law, then it does not matter from whenc
