KWAKU FRIMPONG @ IBOMAN v. THE REPUBLIC
2015
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- G. PWAMANG, J.S.C. SITTING AS A SINGLE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
- Civil Procedure
2015
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
G. Pwamang, J.S.C., sitting as a single Justice of the Supreme Court, considered an application filed pro se by a convicted robber that was styled as a request “to appeal for review,” and treated it as an application to extend time to seek review of a unanimous Supreme Court decision dated 18 January 2012. The applicant had been convicted by the Accra High Court in 2006, his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2008, and the Supreme Court later reduced his sentence to 40 years effective from his 2002 arrest. Filed in August 2015, the motion came 3 years and 8 months after the decision; the Attorney‑General filed no response. Applying Rule 55 and Rule 60 of C.I. 16 and precedents including Botchway v. Appiah and Agyekum v. Asakum Engineering, the court held that the delay was not timeous, no sound or credible reasons were provided, and the review jurisdiction cannot serve as a further appeal. The application was refused.
The applicant and three (3) other accomplices were convicted by the High
Court, Accra on the 26th of August 2006 for the offences of conspiracy to
commit robbery and robbery and were sentenced to 65 years each In Hard
Labour (IHL).
Applicant herein appealed to the Court of Appeal which on the 23rd Day of
October 2008 dismissed his appeal against conviction and sentence. He
further appealed to the Supreme Court and on the 18/1/2012 the court
dismissed his appeal against conviction but reduced his sentence to 40 years
IHL to run from the date of arrest which was 2002.
This present application was filed on the 5/8/2015 by the applicant in person;
not acting through a lawyer. He described the application in the motion paper
as follows: “Motion on notice for leave to appeal for review”. When one
considers the substance of the motion, it is essentially an application for
extension of time to apply for a review of the decision of the regular panel of
this court which gave its decision on the 18/1/12. So I shall consider the
application as one for extension of time.
Rule 55 of the Supreme Court Rules 1996 (CI 16) provides as follows: “An
Application for review shall be filed at the registry of the court not later than
one month from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.”
Rule 60 of CI 16 provides as follows: “Any of the time limits specified in this
part may on application be extended or abridged by the court.”
Rule 60 of CI 16 does not set a time limit within which an application for
extension of time to apply for a review of a decision of the court may be filed.
It is unlike rule 8(4) of CI 16 on civil appeal and rule 66 on the supervisory
decision of the court which both set time limit for application for extension of
time.
Nevertheless I am being called upon by the applicant to exercise a discretion in
his favour and extend time for him. Though the state has been served with the
application and with a number of hearing notices nothing has been filed on
behalf of the Attorney General. That notwithstanding I am required to
consider the grounds of the application as contained in the affidavit in support
of the motion to determine whether a proper case has been made for time to
be extended.
In the case of Botchway Vrs. Appiah [2003/04] SCGLR 137, Adade JSC stated
as follows at page 139; “If an extension of time should be sought, it must be for
sound and convincing reasons sufficient to induce the court to sympathise w