JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
On 30 May 1968, the appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Kumasi, on one count of possessing three forged Bank of Ghana ten new cedi notes, contrary to section 18 (2) of the Currency Act, 1964 (Act 242). He admitted to one previous conviction for stealing and one for attempted stealing for which he had been sentenced to three months' imprisonment with hard labour on 28 May 1966 in the Circuit Court, Kumasi. The circuit court thereupon sentenced the appellant to seven years' imprisonment with hard labour and remarked that the appellant "has criminal propensities and must be dealt with severely." It is against the conviction and sentence that the appellant appealed to this court. At the summary hearing the appellant abandoned the appeal against his conviction and sought to appeal against the sentence on the ground that the sentence was excessive. I took the view at the hearing that, like many cases of its kind pending before me, the appeal against the sentence entailed a consideration of the validity of the reasoning of Amissah J.A. (sitting as an additional judge in the High Court) in the case of Fulani v. The State, High Court, 19 January 1968, unreported; digested in (1968) C.C. 67. I was in some difficulty as I found the matter a little confusing having regard to previous decisions of the Court of Appeal. I therefore made the following order, after granting leave to appeal against the sentence, since the appellant was not represented by counsel:
"I want legal argument touching on this problem as I find the matter one of extreme difficulty. Although I do not seem to find myself in agreement with Amissah J.A., I think his opinion is entitled to the greatest respect and because the decision may very well be right I am anxious that learned counsel assist me in resolving the matter. For this reason I will assign the conduct of this appeal on behalf of the appellant to counsel D. M. Adusei."
Thereafter I heard arguments from counsel for the parties and I must say that I have been tremendously assisted by the able and painstaking efforts of both counsel.
Before considering the decision in Fulani v. The State (supra) it may be necessary to remember that that decision was not the first High Court decision which laid down the proposition that a circuit court trying a case summarily must not pass a higher sentence than a district court trying the same case could pass. In State v. Boye, High Court, 26 January 1966,unreported; digest
