June 14, 2017
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
In this Supreme Court judgment authored by V. J. M. Dotse JSC, representatives of the Kejetia traders challenged Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly’s plan to demolish shops at the Kejetia Bus Terminal, alleging lack of valuation and compensation and seeking declarations and orders concerning the project. The High Court set aside their writ for noncompliance with section 127 of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462). The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the notice sufficient and section 56’s compensation procedure discretionary. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that section 127’s mandatory particulars—names, place of abode, cause of action, and reliefs—were not provided; thus, the notice was defective and the suit must be set aside. It further clarified that seeking compensation is optional, but if pursued, section 56’s statutory procedure must be followed. The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeal’s decision, restored the High Court’s ruling, and made no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
DOTSE JSC:-
The Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents, hereafter referred to as Plaintiffs filed a writ of summons against the Defendants/Respondents/Appellants, hereafter Defendants in the High Court Kumasi claiming several reliefs which will be referred to in extenso.
Due to the nature of the reliefs being claimed especially against the 1st Defendants, it was statutorily incumbent upon the Plaintiffs to satisfy the requirements imposed in section 127 of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462).
It must be noted at this stage that, Act 462 has been repealed by section 235 (1) of the Local Government Act, 2016 (Act 936). However, the corresponding provisions in section 210 of Act 936 are similar in context to the provisions of section 127 of the repealed Act 462. However, since at all times relevant to the cause of this action it was the repealed Act 462 that was the operating law, it is that law that will be substantially referred to herein.
What then does section 127 of Act 462 provide. This section provides as follows:-
Notice of suit to be given to Assembly
(1) “ A suit shall not be commenced against a District Assembly until one month at least after written notice of intention to commence the suit has been served upon the Assembly by the intending plaintiff or the agent of the plaintiff.
(2) The notice shall state the cause of action, the names and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which the plaintiff claims.” Emphasis
In compliance with the said provisions, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, Kwasi Afrifa issued a notice by which he sought to comply with the said statutory pre conditions.
From the above provisions, the following requirements must be met by an intending plaintiff or his or their agents who intends to institute action against any Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assemblies one month before the suit is filed and served. These are:-
The cause of action
Names of the intended Plaintiff or Plaintiffs
The place of abode of the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs
The intended reliefs to be sought
Additionally, the one month statutory period stated in Section 127 must have elapsed from the date of the notice and the date of the inception of the suit against the Defendant. Since the 1st Defendant is a Metropolitan Assembly, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs duly complied by giving the said notice.
However since the instant appeal touches and concerns the rival interpretations placed upon the requirement and e