JUDGMENT OF BENIN J.
There was an accident on 15 March 1986 on the Tamale-Buipe road involving a vehicle owned by the second defendant and at the [p.345] material moment, driven by the first defendant through which the plaintiff’s son, Kobbina Kombia, a fare-paying passenger, met his death. The plaintiff as the father and administrator of the deceased’s estate on 19 September 1987 sued out this writ claiming certain reliefs against the defendant by virtue of the Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176). The defendants personally entered an appearance and later filed a statement of defence per their solicitor. Summons for directions was taken and the suit set down for hearing. On the hearing date counsel for the defendants raised what he called preliminary legal objections, namely:
(i) that since the letters of administration was taken in the joint names of the plaintiff and Akosua Bawa (the widow), the action should have been instituted in their joint names; and
(ii) that since there is an infant beneficiary, the action should be taken by his next friend and this should be clearly indicated by the writ.
He therefore submitted that the action was not properly before the court. In reply, counsel for the plaintiff said the defendants having entered an appearance and filed a defence without raising any objection to the writ, cannot now be heard to say the action was not properly before the court.
The objection, simple as it appears to be, raised very pertinent points in procedure. The first question is, should all the administrators join in an action on behalf of the dependants? I think the letters of administration was granted to the two persons in response to the demands of section 77 (1) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act 63) which reads in the relevant part that: “. . . administration shall, if there is any beneficiary who is an infant . . . be granted either to a trust corporation, with or without an individual, or to not less than two individuals.”
The rationale for this provision is clear that it aims at ensuring that the infant’s interest is safeguarded at any time, which is better secured if administration is vested in more than one person. It would thus appear that the court, by the grant of the letters of administration to two or more persons, wants them all to act in concert or one on behalf of the others but with their knowledge and approval; in other words one should not act arbitrarily or exclusively in order to ensure unity of p
