JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.A.
This is an appeal from the decision of the High Court, Accra dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for recovery of possession of some shop rooms and offices in house No D. 546/4, popularly known as Pasico House at Liberty Avenue, Accra against the first defendant, the respondent in this appeal. The plaintiff’s claims for damages for loss of use and general damages were also dismissed. The plaintiff however obtained judgment against the second and the third defendants in that same case for recovery of possession. These defendants have not appealed.
By an agreement dated 31 May 1973 and registered as No. 1216/73, the first defendant (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) entered into a tenancy arrangement with Paterson Simons (Ghana) Ltd. in respect of the house the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim. By a resolution of the company dated 11 June 1976, Paterson Simons (Ghana) Ltd. changed its name to Pasico (Ghana) Ltd. It then sold its interest in the house to the plaintiff (also referred to hereinafter as the appellant) by a deed of assignment dated 8 May 1984 and registered as No. 3558/85 with the Deeds Registry. Pasico (Ghana) Ltd. then terminated its tenancy agreement with the respondent by a letter dated 23 March 1984 and requested the respondent to give up possession of the rooms it occupied in that house by 31 January 1985. By a similar letter of the same date however, the respondent was required to give up possession of the premises by 31 August 1985. The respondent, who then recognised the appellant as its new landlord, received a letter dated 23 March 1984 from the appellant asking it to quit the premises by 31 December 1984. On 23 August 1985 the appellant wrote again to the respondent requesting it to give up possession of the premises within "six months from 26 August 1985" so that he could remodel or use the premises or both for his own business. On 26 August 1985, the appellant wrote again to the respondent requesting the respondent to quit within six months from that date so that he could carry out the purpose stated in his letter of 23 August 1985. Since the respondent's tenancy had expired then, it became recognised as a statutory tenant. There is no dispute on this. As at 10 April 1986 when the appellant issued his writ of summons against the respondent, the respondent had not vacated the premises; hence the reliefs claimed in the action.
The appellant's original grounds of appeal contained in the notice of
