JOSEPH KOBEAH & 39 ORS v. TEMA OIL REFINERY & ORS
2004
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- KPEGAH, J.S.C. (PRESIDING)
- ATUGUBA, J.S.C.
- AKUFFO, J.S.C.
- DR. TWUM, J.S.C.
- PROF. KLUDZE, J.S.C
Areas of Law
- Employment Law
- Contract Law
2004
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Supreme Court of Ghana decided a labor dispute arising from the termination of 119 unionized workers at Tema Oil Refinery after a week-long occupation and disruption in late September and early October 1990. Evidence described workers blocking the Administration Block, surrounding offices with drums and war songs, stoning a vehicle, and rendering the refinery ungovernable until security agencies intervened. Management issued uniform termination letters invoking Article 4(vii) of the 1987 Collective Agreement, paying all entitlements and one month’s salary in lieu of notice, without stating reasons. Writing for the Court, Dr. S. Twum held that Article 4(vii) forms part of each worker’s contract and contains no requirement to assign reasons for termination; the 1987 Agreement superseded the 1984 Agreement. Justice Atuguba concurred, reasoning that reading Article 21(4) into Article 4(vii) would defeat the mutual right of termination. The appeal was dismissed.
KPEGAH, J.S.C. I have had the benefit of reading beforehand, the opinion to be
delivered by my brother Dr. Twum, J.S.C. I agree with him. I have nothing useful to add.
F. Y. KPEGAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
ATUGUBA J.S.C.
I desire to make a brief contribution to the determination of this case.
The battle is pitched mainly between articles 4 (vii) and 21 (4) of the 1987 Collective Agreement between the parties. Article 4 (vii) provides as follows : “All employees who have been confirmed in their employment shall be given one month’s notice on termination or pay in lieu and vice versa on resignation.
In case of summary dismissal no notice shall be given.” Article 21 (4) on the other hand provides as follows: “(4) One of the following reasons may justify the termination of the employment or the dismissal of the employee….” A litany of reasons, which it is not necessary to set out, then follows.
The Appellants were terminated under article 4 (vii) of the Collective Agreement. Counsel however contends that both articles 4 (vii) and 21 (4) ought to be read together or else 21 (4) would be rendered otiose. Even if the two provisions are read together they would not in my view have the effect contended for by counsel, namely that reasons are required for termination of the contract of employment even under article 4 (vii). It must be noticed that article 4 (vii) clearly sets out to give both the Employer and the Employee a mutual right to terminate the contract of employment.
That provision to my mind means that either side must either give one month prior notice of termination or one month’s salary in lieu thereof. If that is so, to require reasons to be given or ascertained as an additional precondition would run counter to the objective of that stipulation. If the employer is to go through disciplinary investigative procedure before he exercises his right of termination under article 4 (vii), could it reasonably be thought that the employee must likewise go through such a procedure before exercising his right of termination under that provision? What would be the grounds that the employee would have to satisfy in this regard under article 21 (4) (a) – (l)? Clearly none. That being so would the mutuality of the right of termination given to both the Employer and the employee under article 4 (vii) be given effect? Clearly not. Therefore Counsel’s contention would defeat the intent of the parties conveyed by article 4 (vii). The intent of the parties t