INKUMSAH v. THE REPUBLI

JUDGMENT OF AZU CRABBE J.A.

Azu Crabbe J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. On 7 November 1967, we upheld an objection that this court had no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, and we accordingly dismissed it and intimated that we would give our reason later. We now proceed to state those reasons.

This is an appeal from an order of the Chairman of the Commission on Investigation of Assets whereby the appellant was on 8 February 1967, sentenced to six months' imprisonment with hard labour for the offence of perjury.

It is unnecessary for us to state the sequence of events leading to the decision, for upon the appeal being called the learned Chief State Attorney, Mr. S. M. Boison, raised an objection in limine that no appeal lay to this court against the decision of a commission appointed under the National Liberation Council (Investigation and Forfeiture of Assets) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 72). The commission before which the appellant was found guilty of perjury and sentenced was appointed by virtue of paragraph 2 (1) of N.L.C.D. 72, and paragraph 2 (2) of the Decree as amended by the National [p.779] Liberation Council (Investigation and Forfeiture of Assets) (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 174), reads:

"A Commission appointed by virtue of this paragraph shall consist of not less than two persons and shall have a Chairman who shall be a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court or a person who has previously held any such office."

By paragraph 4 (1) of the same Decree a person who felt aggrieved by the finding of the commission in respect of his assests was given the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court had the power "to confirm, vary or set aside the finding of the Commission or remit the finding to the Commission for reconsideration by the Commission." In paragraph 4 (3) the Supreme Court was enjoined to take into consideration in arriving at its decision "any enactment for the time being in force regulating the conduct of appeals from the High Court to the Supreme Court in civil cases" and to apply its provisions to appeals brought before it under N.L.C.D. 72, with such modifications as were necessary. Here we see that when the framers of the N.L.C.D. Decree 72 intended to confer a right of appeal against the decision of the Commission they stated in expressly, and in a clear and unambiguous language.

It is important to note well the subsequent fate of paragraph 4 (1), for we think that its repeal