1999
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Supreme Court, per Sophia A.B. Akuffo J.S.C., addressed a preliminary objection to a motion for certiorari seeking to quash a ruling of the High Court, Bolgatanga, delivered on 6 June 1997 in Originating Summons No. 1/1996. Counsel for the Interested Party argued the application was incompetent because it was filed on 14 November 1997, beyond the time limits set by the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16). The Court emphasized Rule 62’s three‑month filing deadline and Rule 66’s prohibition on seeking extensions after expiration, noting its discretion to extend time exists only when sought within the same three months. Concluding it lacked jurisdiction, the panel—presided over by E.K. Wiredu with A.K.B. Ampiah, F.Y. Kpegah, and E.D.K. Adjabeng—struck out the motion.
RULING
SOPHIA A.B. AKUFFO, J.S.C.:
This is a motion praying for an Order of Certiorari quashing the ruling delivered on 6th June, 1997, by the High Court Judge, Bolgatanga, in Originating Summons No. 1/1996. In his Statement of Case in Opposition to the application herein, Counsel for the Interested Party has raised a preliminary point of law challenging the competency of the motion. The basis for the preliminary point is simple, though fundamental, and it is that the application is out of time and, therefore, not in compliance with Rule 62 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16). Consequently, it is necessary for us to deal first with this preliminary point of law, since, in the event it is valid, there will be no need for us to embark upon the merits of the application itself.
According to the said Statement of Case, the application is out of time because although the decision sought to be quashed was delivered on 6th June, 1997, the motion herein was filed on 14th November, 1997. These dates are borne out by the record.
Rules 61 to 66 of C.I. 16 govern the procedure for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. Rule 62 is quite clear and it succinctly sets out, as follows, the time limits within which applications invoking the jurisdiction may be brought:—
“An application to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court shall be filed within three months of the date of the decision against which the jurisdiction is invoked unless the time is extended by the Court.”
Additionally, Rule 66 further clarifies the matter of time limits in the following manner:—
“An application for the extension of time within which to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 62 shall not be made after the expiration of the three months period within which an application seeking to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction may be filed.”
The combined effect of these provisions is so clear as to require no lengthy expatriation. Suffice it to say that, by these provisions, a party seeking to invoke our supervisory jurisdiction must file his application within the stipulated time, unless we have specifically extended that time for him, which extension must have been obtained within the same three months period. Thus our discretion to adjust the time frame is tightly limited to extensions for which application is made within time. For the purposes of invoking our supervisory jurisdiction, time is, clearly, a crucial factor, with which an appli