JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.
By his writ of summons, the plaintiff Davy Hayford, claims, as agent of Duncan Augustt, the return of a deposit of ¢10,000 paid by the said Duncan Augustt for an estate houses at Teshie-Nungua. The facts giving rise to the claim are not in dispute. They are that on or about 9 August 1976, the plaintiff, on behalf of Duncan Augustt, applied for the allocation of an estate house to the said Duncan Augustt. The application was accepted and the plaintiff, on behalf of Duncan Augustt, paid a deposit of ¢10,000 towards the purchase price of the house. No house was allocated to Duncan Augustt. On or about 10 February 1977, the plaintiff informed the defendants that Duncan Augustt was no longer interested in the allocation of an estate house. and asked the defendants to refund the deposit of ¢10,000. The defendants refused to do so, and on these proceedings have put up two defences, namely: (a) the plaintiff not being a party to the contract cannot sue thereon and (b) no time was fixed by the contract for the allocation of a house to Duncan Augutt.s.
[p.183]
This ruling is concerned with the first of these two grounds since, if the plaintiff has no right to bring the action, the defendants are entitled to an order dismissing the suit without considering the alternative defence.
In support of his objection, Mr. Quaye, counsel for the defendants, referred to the case of Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. v. Harlley [1976] 1 G.L.R. 158, C.A. where at p. 162 Anin J.A. delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal said, "The fundamental principle of the common law is that only a party or privy to a contact can repudiate or else sue for rescission of contract, or claim benefit therefrom." Counsel contended that although the decision of the ordinary bench was reversed by the full bench the principle of law stated by Anin J. A. was accepted by the full bench.
"I have read the judgment of the ordinary bench as well as that of the full bench, which is reported sub nom. Harilley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179. In delivering the judgment of the court, Azu Crabbe C.J. said at p. 195:
". . . I think the conclusion based on lack of privity of contract requires closer consideration. The common law principle that no one is entitled to or bound by the terms of a contract to which he was not an original party has normally been rigorously applied by the courts. But this doctrine of privity of contract which as proclaimed in the nineteenth
