JUDGMENT OF BENIN J.
I believe this application has once again brought into sharp focus the argument whether or not there should not be a time limit after which a party will not be permitted to have a default judgment vacated. We know that under Order 13, r. 11 and Order 27, r. 16 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) a party in default can always apply to vacate a judgment obtained in default of appearance and defence respectively against him, and there is no time limit as to when he can do this. Even though Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) in Akrong v. Ashiefie, Court of Appeal, 20 October 1967, unreported; digested in (1968) C.C. 14 has said that the requirement of justice is the limiting consideration in such an application, yet the overwhelming authority on the subject is in favour of setting aside if the party reasonably wants to be heard on the merits. I shall return to some of these authorities subsequently, as it appears the requirement of justice has no definitive status.
The history of this case is the following and I reiterate what I said in the judgment of this court dated 12 July 1988: The writ was issued on 14 June 1977 and served on the defendants on 31 August 1977. The defendants entered no appearance to the writ. A subsequent change of solicitors was served on the defendants on 8 December 1981. A copy of a notice of amendment filed on 3 June 1982 was also served on the defendants on 28 June 1982. A judgment in default of appearance was therefore entered against the defendants in 1982. The matter was fixed for assessment of damages and again the defendants were notified but they still did not appear.
After taking evidence from the relevant persons but before he could deliver his final judgment, Jones Mensah J., presiding over this court, left the bench. Since I took over the conduct of the case I have caused two hearing notices to be served on the defendants but still they did not show up. It seemed clear therefore that the defendants were not interested in the case, so I took evidence and assessed the damages. The plaintiffs then took steps to go into execution. The fiat of the Attorney-General was sought but it was not forthcoming. So on the expiry of the statutory time for the Attorney-General's fiat to issue, the plaintiffs applied for a [p.5] garnishee order. At the hearing of the garnishee, the Attorney-General's representative sought for and obtained three months' adjournment to enable them take steps to settl
