GABIENOO v. THE REPUBLIC
1970
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- Francois J
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
1970
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The court considered the ambiguity in the particulars of the second count, specifically whether 'you' referred to the appellant or the second accused who was acquitted. Although the judge believed an amendment to specify the appellant's name would not cause prejudice, the authorities, including R. v Michalski, dissuaded such action as it is irregular to amend particulars post-arraignment in a way that could affect the identity of the accused.
EXTRACT FROM JUDGMENT:
“I have already referred to the fact that the particulars in the second count are in the singular; there is therefore the added ambiguity of the ‘you’ in the said particulars referring to either the appellant or the second accused who was acquitted, or to both in which case a further admission to a mistake in numbers must be made. My mind has been considerably exercised whether to amend the particulars of the second count proprio motu by inserting the name of the appellant to read ’For that you Mikodome Kofi Gabienoo on the 1st day of May 1969 etc. etc.’ To my mind, such an amendment would hardly take the appellant by surprise or embarrass him, neither could he be said to be prejudiced as in fact it hardly departs from the charge he faced, and the appellant’s conviction would have been proper had the first count not fallen by the wayside. Though I feel no injustice might arise by such an amendment the authorities are against such a course. I am dissuaded first by the case of R. v Michalski (1955) 39 Cr. App. R. 22 where it was held objectionable and irregular to strike out the name of a prisoner who has been arraigned, to ensure the separate trial of another, under the guise of amendment.”