EWUSIE-MENSAH v. EWUSIE-MENSAH AND ANOTHER
March 10, 1992
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- SAPONG J.
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Evidence Law
March 10, 1992
HIGH COURT
GHANA
CORAM
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The plaintiff had closed his case. The defendant was being cross-examined. In the course of the cross-examination, learned counsel for the defence filed a motion under Order 32, r. 6 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) for an order to sign final judgment upon admissions made by the plaintiff in the pleadings and during the trial.
Paragraphs (2), (3) and (5) of the supporting affidavit read:
"(2) I am advised by counsel and verily believe same to be true that the plaintiff has in examination-in-chief on oath as well as during cross-examination admitted the reliefs sought by the co-defendant in paragraphs (14), (24) and (27) (d) of the statement of defence and counterclaim filed on 14 March 1991.
(3) I verily believe that the plaintiff made these admissions on 2 May 1991. The plaintiff also makes part admission in this respect in paragraph (15) of his reply filed on 4 April 1991 . . .
(5) There are compelling reasons why the honourable court ought to give judgment now in respect of the admissions. The items in the plaintiff's possession are definitely deteriorating almost daily and are urgently required by the defendant and co-defendant. The pick-up No. ARB 820 cannot be used until the key is returned."
Counsel contends further that paragraph (3) of the affidavit in opposition filed on 11 February 1992 is in contempt of this court and was made in bad faith.
Learned counsel for the plaintiff says the application before the court is irregular and totally misconceived. He maintains that the plaintiff has not made any admissions as deposed to in the said paragraph (2) of the supporting affidavit. He seriously contends that an application under Order 32, r. 6 of L.N. 140A cannot be founded on evidence given on oath during trial but on pleadings. The "otherwise" in Order 32, r. 6 of L.N. 140A cannot be interpreted to mean evidence given during trial. Further, the evidence being dwelt upon should have been exhibited. This was not done.
Paragraph (14) of the defence and counterclaim has been denied. Order 32, r. 6 of L.N. 140A provides that:
"6. Any party may at any stage of a cause or matter, where admissions of facts have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the Court or a Judge for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question betwee
AI Generated Summary
In the High Court, after the plaintiff had closed his case and during the defendant’s cross-examination, defence counsel sought final judgment under Order 32, r. 6 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), arguing that the plaintiff had admitted the co-defendant’s reliefs both in pleadings and during testimony. The supporting affidavit cited admissions made on 2 May 1991 and part admissions in the plaintiff’s reply of 4 April 1991, and pressed urgency due to deteriorating items and a vehicle key. Plaintiff’s counsel opposed, calling the motion irregular and misconceived, insisting Rule 6 concerns admissions on pleadings or in writing, not trial evidence, and noting the alleged evidence was not exhibited. Parsing “at any stage” and “or otherwise,” the court held admissions for Rule 6 are limited to pleadings, writing, or verbal admissions outside trial; testimony during trial does not qualify. Citing Graves v. Terry, the judge also noted that a defendant’s motion after a reply is refused. The application was denied.