1998
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Two appellants, convicted and sentenced to death for robbery by the Ashanti Regional Public Tribunal, Kumasi, on 4 March 1991, sought from the Supreme Court a grant of a right of appeal after failing to lodge an appeal before the National Public Tribunal ceased under the 1992 Constitution. In 1998 they appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed for want of jurisdiction relying on The People v. Sarpong/Surpong. Writing for the majority, Mrs. J. Bamford‑Addo J.S.C. held that the right of appeal is statutory and refused the request. The Court nevertheless examined the legality of the death sentence under PNDCL 78, emphasizing that section 16(1) requires disclosure of “very grave circumstances,” which the Tribunal did not provide. Exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 132, the majority substituted a fixed term of 15 years’ imprisonment with hard labour from the original conviction date. Hayfron‑Benjamin, Adjabeng, and Ms. Akuffo agreed. Atuguba J.S.C. dissented, insisting ouster clauses barred interference and the Court lacked supervisory authority over a defunct tribunal.
MRS. J. BAMFORD-ADDO, J.S.C.:
The Appellants herein are in effect praying this court for a grant to them of the right of Appeal to enable them to appeal their conviction and sentence of Death for Robbery Contrary to Section 149 of the Criminal Code 1960 (Act 29).
They were tried and convicted by the Ashanti Regional Public Tribunal Kumasi on the 4th March 1991 but failed to appeal to the National Appeal Tribunal until after the 1992 Constitution. On January 12th, 1998 they appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction relying on the Supreme Court case of The People v. Surpong and others No.2/93 dated 28/6/93 S.C. unreported.
Under Section 7(3) of the Transitional Provisions of the 1992 Constitution cases partly heard before the National Public Tribunal shall be continued and completed before that Tribunal after which the Tribunal shall ceases to exist either on completion of the hearing or within six months after the coming into force of the 1992 Constitution which ever is earlier. In this case there was no pending case before the National Public Tribunal as the Appellants failed to appeal, until the Tribunal ceased to exist.
They have now applied to us to grant them a right of Appeal but since the right of appeal is a statutory right given by legislation this court has no power to grant their request and their application is therefore dismissed in respect of the request for a right of Appeal.
There is no doubt that the Regional Tribunal has jurisdiction to try the offence of Robbery see S.4(c) of PNDCL 78. However we have considered the legality of the sentence of Death imposed on Appellants. Under Section 16(1) of PNDCL 78
"16(1) Subject to (7) of this section the death penalty may be imposed by a Public Tribunal for such offences as may be specified in writing by the council and in respect of cases where the Tribunal is satisfied that very grave circumstances meriting such a penalty have been revealed."
Section 16(5) also provides that:
"S. 16(5) where a Public Tribunal determines that an offence triable under this law is subject to specified penalties under a pre-existing law at the time of its commission the Tribunal may in its discretion apply such penalties in appropriate cases in so far as such application is consistent with the terms, effect and purposes of this law."
In this case the trial Tribunal should have specified the reasons why the Appellants merited the death sentence rather than the sente