Judgment:
This is an appeal from the Agona Native Court. The plaintiff, Ekua Appia, (now the respondent) claimed as against Kojo Bekwii (now the appellant) recovery of possession of a cocoa farm.
The Native Court found proved that when Kwamin Sam bought some forest land he gave as a gift to his daughter, the respondent, a piece of this land.
On the 16th April, 1941 a writ of Fi. Fa. was executed against the land of Kwamin Sam and the piece of land sold to his daughter was included in that sale. The Court found that the respondent was away at the time of that sale.
There was evidence that upon her return she became aware of this fact and approached the appellant, apprising him of this fact and that in consequence he promised conditionally to return this piece of land to her.
The respondent ultimately issued a writ out of the Native Court some seven years after the sale claiming recovery of possession. Upon these facts the Native Court granted to the respondent an order for the recovery of possession of that farm.
From this decision the appellant has appealed to this Court on the grounds argued before me that:
(a) the judgment was against the weight of evidence, and
(b) that plaintiff is estopped by her own laches or delay in bringing the suit herein.
With regard to the first ground of appeal there was ample evidence upon which the Court, if it accepted that evidence, could make the order prayed for and clearly it did accept the evidence of the respondent.
In regard to the equitable defence of "laches" and in determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches the chief points to be considered are (1) acquiescence on the plaintiff's part and (2) any change of position that has occurred on the appellant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the plaintiff has become aware of it.
Regard must also be had to any change in the position of the appellant which has resulted from the respondent's delay in bringing her action.
Apart from these considerations and where there is no statutory bar the delay may be so great as in itself to constitute laches and render the claim stale, so that a Court of Equity will decline to enforce it. Here the laches depends on the mere negligence of the plaintiff to enforce her rights. And 20 years may be taken as the period which in practice will bar claim on the ground of delay.
Lea
