JUDGMENT OF APALOO J.A.
This appeal is from the judgment of the Circuit Court, Sunyani (his honour Judge Okai), dated 11 January 1968. The judgment, dismissed a claim by the appellant to recover from the respondents £G474 or N¢948.00 being the balance of money lent by the appellant to the first respondent and guaranteed by the other respondents.
The transaction was evidenced in writing and was produced in evidence. It states that the first respondent received from the appellant the sum of £G600 "being money borrowed without interest." The agreement then stipulates the dates when repayments were to be made and the amount of such repayment. This was invariably shown as £G50. The appellant's complaint was, that the first respondent made default with the payment and by November 1964, he had paid only £G126. The writ was taken out to recover the unpaid balance. The respondents admit the loan transaction and the fact that only £G126 out of it was repaid. But they averred that in truth the actual sum they received from the appellant [p.262] was £G360. According to them, the appellant agreed to grant them a loan of £G400. He was to charge interest of £G200. Thus their total agreed indebtedness was £G600. This was what was stated in the document which the appellant caused to he prepared. But when they came to receive the physical cash, the appellant deducted from it £G40. This sum was said to be a permitted customary deduction called "Nteani" or "Drink." The respondents therefore claimed that the transaction was harsh and unconscionable and they prayed that it be re-opened under the Loans Recovery Ordinance, Cap. 175 (1951 Rev.). The appellant disputed this version of the facts and stuck to his story that he gave out to the respondents £G600 in cash without any deduction and entirely without interest.
A serious issue was therefore joined between the parties on the facts. The learned circuit judge resolved this in favour of the respondents. He held accordingly that the appellant contravened various provisions of the Moneylenders Ordinance, Cap. 176 (1951 Rev.), and that the loan was therefore irrecoverable. It is this conclusion that the appellant sought to reverse by this appeal.
Mr. Reindorf for the appellant did not question the learned judge's conclusion on the facts. This is an extremely simple issue of fact and eminently suited for the determination of a tribunal of first instance. I do not think counsel would have met with any success if he had attempte
