DR. JACOB EMMANUEL OPPONG v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL

RULING

JOYCE BAMFORD-ADDO, J.S.C:

The brief facts of this case are that the Plaintiff was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE), by the President in accordance with Article 232(2) of the 1992 Constitution on the 6th July 1993 till 28th August 1999 when he was removed from office in accordance with Articles 236 and 146 of the Constitution. Under Article 236 the procedure for the removal of the Deputy chairman of NCCE shall be the same as provided for the removal of a Justice of the High Court under Article 146(1) which says

"A Justice of the Superior Court or a chairman of the Regional Tribunal shall not be removed from office except for stated misbehaviour or incompetence or on ground of inability to perform the functions of his office arising from infirmity of body or mind".

The procedure provided for the removal of a High Court Judge was that when the President receives a petition for the removal of a High Court Judge or Chairman of a Regional Tribunal he refer same to the Chief Justice whose duty it is to determine whether there is a prima facie case or not.

If there is, the Chief Justice is empowered to set up a Committee to investigate the allegation of 'stated misbehaviour' against the person accused and then, if proved, to make final recommendation to the Chief Justice who would then forward same to the President.

Article 146(9) says:—

"The President shall in each case, act in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee".

In this case the President received a petition containing complaints of stated misbehaviours against the Plaintiff and consequently the requisite procedure referred to above was set in motion. The Justice George Acquah Committee i.e. 2nd Defendant herein, was appointed which investigated the alleged stated misbehaviour and thereafter made findings of fact and recommendations to the President on account of which the Plaintiff was removed from office.

The Plaintiff took action against the Defendants by the invocation of the exclusive original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 130(1) (a) seeking an interpretation of Articles 146(1) and 236 of the Constitution. The various reliefs sought are contained in 16 paragraphs of the writ. In my view two of those reliefs are pertinent here, namely:

(1) A declaration that by the combined effect of Articles 146(1), (3) and (5) and 236 of the Constitution, and by their proper interpretation the standards set for the remov