DR. JACOB EMMANUEL OPPONG v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL
2003
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- MRS. BAMFORD ADDO, J.S.C. (PRESIDING)
- ADZOE, J.S.C.
- AFREH, J.S.C.
- BADDOO, J.S.C.
- DR. TWUM, J.S.C
Areas of Law
- Constitutional Law
- Civil Procedure
- Administrative Law
2003
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Justice Joyce Bamford-Addo (presiding) delivered the principal ruling on a preliminary objection to Dr. Jacob Emmanuel Oppong’s suit challenging his removal as Deputy Chairman of the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE). Following a petition from NCCE Chairman Larry Bimi, a committee chaired by Justice G.K. Acquah investigated allegations of insubordination and inappropriate conduct, accepted the evidence, and recommended removal; the President acted under Article 146(9). Oppong then invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction seeking constitutional declarations, nullification, reinstatement, injunction, and damages. The Court held the suit was essentially a wrongful removal claim rather than a genuine constitutional interpretation matter and that Article 295(1) treats Article 146 committees as commissions of inquiry whose adverse findings are deemed High Court judgments under Article 280, appealable to the Court of Appeal. The preliminary objection was upheld and the action dismissed. Justice T.K. Adzoe wrote a concurring opinion; Justices Afreh, Baddoo, and Dr. Twum agreed.
RULING
JOYCE BAMFORD-ADDO, J.S.C:
The brief facts of this case are that the Plaintiff was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE), by the President in accordance with Article 232(2) of the 1992 Constitution on the 6th July 1993 till 28th August 1999 when he was removed from office in accordance with Articles 236 and 146 of the Constitution. Under Article 236 the procedure for the removal of the Deputy chairman of NCCE shall be the same as provided for the removal of a Justice of the High Court under Article 146(1) which says
"A Justice of the Superior Court or a chairman of the Regional Tribunal shall not be removed from office except for stated misbehaviour or incompetence or on ground of inability to perform the functions of his office arising from infirmity of body or mind".
The procedure provided for the removal of a High Court Judge was that when the President receives a petition for the removal of a High Court Judge or Chairman of a Regional Tribunal he refer same to the Chief Justice whose duty it is to determine whether there is a prima facie case or not.
If there is, the Chief Justice is empowered to set up a Committee to investigate the allegation of 'stated misbehaviour' against the person accused and then, if proved, to make final recommendation to the Chief Justice who would then forward same to the President.
Article 146(9) says:—
"The President shall in each case, act in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee".
In this case the President received a petition containing complaints of stated misbehaviours against the Plaintiff and consequently the requisite procedure referred to above was set in motion. The Justice George Acquah Committee i.e. 2nd Defendant herein, was appointed which investigated the alleged stated misbehaviour and thereafter made findings of fact and recommendations to the President on account of which the Plaintiff was removed from office.
The Plaintiff took action against the Defendants by the invocation of the exclusive original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 130(1) (a) seeking an interpretation of Articles 146(1) and 236 of the Constitution. The various reliefs sought are contained in 16 paragraphs of the writ. In my view two of those reliefs are pertinent here, namely:
(1) A declaration that by the combined effect of Articles 146(1), (3) and (5) and 236 of the Constitution, and by their proper interpretation the standards set for the remov