DOMINIC KOFI ANIM v. THE REPUBLIC
2018
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- F.G. KORBIEH, J.A. (PRESIDING)
- AGNES M. A. DORDZIE (MRS.), J.A.
- I.O.TANKO AMADU, J.A
Areas of Law
- Criminal Law and Procedure
- Constitutional Law
- Evidence Law
2018
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This Ghana Court of Appeal decision, authored by Justice F.G. Korbieh, reviews a second appeal by an appellant convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery alongside two co-accused. After pleading not guilty, they were convicted in the Circuit Court; the appellant and the second accused received concurrent sentences of 20 years on the conspiracy count and 30 years on robbery with an offensive weapon, while the third accused received 20 years on the first count. The High Court, on first appeal, dismissed their challenge to the sentences, citing sentencing discretion and minimums. On further appeal, the appellant argued that the charge was defective because owner Regina Asantewa was absent, invoked variance rules under Act 30 section 176, urged consideration of first-offender status, and challenged failure to apply constitutional credit for pre-trial custody. The Court held that under Act 29 section 150 and Behome, robbery can be committed against those guarding property; any charge defect was a mere technicality under Act 459 section 31(2). Reaffirming that sentencing is within trial courts’ discretion and appellate interference is limited to wrong principles or manifest excess, the Court dismissed the appeal.
F.G. KORBIEH, J.A.
The appellant herein and two others were tried in the circuit court on two counts of conspiracy to commit crime, to wit, robbery and robbery respectively. He and the two others all pleaded not guilty to the charges and were therefore given a full trial at the end of which they were found guilty and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The appellant and the second accused person were each sentenced to 20 years I.H.L. on count one and 30 years on count two and the sentences were to run concurrently. The third accused was sentenced to 20 years I.H.L. on count one only. All three filed a notice of appeal at the registry of the High Court against the “whole decision” but complained that the sentence imposed on them was too harsh. The relief they sought from the High Court was for the sentence to “be mitigated as the Appellants are first offenders.”
In his judgment delivered on the 22nd day of December, 2016, the learned trial High Court judge, after reviewing the facts of the case and summarizing the submissions of counsel for the appellants, proceeded to interpret the relevant law in the following manner as summarized: he cited the case of Kwaku Frimpong aka Iboman v. The Republic [2012] SCGLR 328 and said that where the minimum sentence was prescribed by law, it superseded the consideration of the accused person being a first offender. He also cited the case of Robertson v. The Republic [2015] 80 GMJ 33 SC where it was said that sentencing is discretionary and whenever discretion is exercised an appellate court had no just cause to interfere with the exercise of the discretion but that an appellate court would interfere with a sentence that was manifestly excessive having regard to the circumstances of the case or where the sentence was wrong in principle. He surmised that in passing sentence, a judge was under a duty not to exercise power in a capricious manner or pronounce a sentence that was harsh and excessive; but to determine what was harsh or excessive, due regard had to be had to the offence, the mode of its commission and the lack of remorse shown as well as the need to send the right signal to other people of the type of the appellant. Having taken all these matters into consideration, the learned judge held the view that he saw nothing wrong with the sentences passed on the appellant and his colleagues and so decided to dismiss their appeal. The 1st appellant alone then launched this appeal on the following ground.