DODZIE SABBAH v. REPUBLIC
2015
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- WOOD (MRS.) CJ, (PRESIDING)
- ADINYIRA (MRS.), JSC
- DOTSE, JSC
- BENIN, JSC
- AKAMBA, JSC
Areas of Law
- Constitutional Law
- Human rights Law
- Civil Procedure
2015
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The Supreme Court addressed an appeal concerning compensation for wrongful imprisonment under Article 14(7) of the 1992 Constitution. The primary issues examined were the discretionary nature of compensation certification and the criteria for awarding compensation. The court affirmed that compensation under Article 14(7) is discretionary, not mandatory, with eligibility and quantum of compensation subject to careful judicial evaluation of all facts. Precedent cases and statutory interpretations guided the court's understanding, emphasizing non-automatic entitlement post-acquittal. Detailed scrutiny and adherence to constitutional principles ensure fair and just decisions, balancing individual rights with public interest.
WOOD (MRS.) CJ,
Article 14(7) of the 1992 Constitution provides an extra layer of protection to personal liberty, consolidating the guaranteed fundamental human right to liberty enshrined in article 14 (1) of the 1992 Constitution. It states:
“Where a person who has served the whole or a part of his sentence is acquitted on appeal by a court, other than the Supreme Court, the court may certify to the Supreme Court that the person acquitted be paid compensation; and the Supreme Court may, upon examination of all the facts and the certificate of the court concerned, award such compensation as it may think fit; or, where acquittal is by the Supreme Court, it may order compensation to be paid to the person acquitted.”
The full scope and effect of article 14 (7) has however never been subjected to judicial scrutiny since the coming into force of the 1992 Constitution. The dominant question in this appeal centres on the grounds on which an appellate court, other than the Supreme Court, may certify to the Supreme Court, pursuant to article 14 (7), that an individual who has served either the whole or part of his sentence, and is subsequently acquitted, be paid compensation.
Central to this broad question is the true and proper construction to be placed on the article 14(7). This appeal thus involves an examination of the jurisprudence on:
(a) the public law remedy available to an aggrieved person under article 14 (7) and;
(b)the principles governing the payment and assessment of compensation, against the State.
What are the key facts which triggered this appeal? In January 1993, the applicant and his brother were arrested and charged with the offences of conspiracy to murder and murder one Amegbor Amedorme. They were convicted on both charges and sentenced to death on August 7th, 2001. He however successfully appealed his convictions on both charges on grounds of jury misdirection.
Following his acquittal, on the 8th of July 2004, he applied, under article 14(7), to the Court of Appeal differently constituted, for certification to the Supreme Court that he be paidC400,000,000(four hundred million old cedis) as compensation for the losses he claimed he had suffered during the period of his incarceration. In opposing the application the State, inter alia, contended via affidavit evidence that the appellant was:
“…lawfully convicted and sentenced according to law after a fair trial where the Natural Justice rule was fully observed.” Furthermore that;
“…the