JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.
The appellant was charged as follows: [his lordship here read the statement of offence as set out in the headnote and continued:] It will be observed that what passed for the statement of offence was in fact the particulars of the offence. The offending section of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), was not stated. Learned counsel for the Republic while admitting this irregularity urged that it was not fatal since it could be cured by the general proviso contained in section 330 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), s. 7. I do not accept this argument. The law enjoins on the prosecutor to be precise as to the charge so that an accused person is aware of what he or she is to answer. The particulars as they stood despite the use of the word "steal" could apply to a host of other crimes.
In R. v. Woods [1968] 3 W.L.R. 1192 at p. 1195, C.A., Phillimore L.J. reading the judgment of the English Court of Appeal which I cite with respectful approval, said:
"It is of the first importance that a man charged with an offence should know with certainty what it is he may be convicted of. No court should be encouraged to cast around to see whether somehow or other the words of the indictment can be found to contain by some arguable implication the seeds of some other offence."
Thus in the long and informative judgment of Adumua-Bossman J.S.C. in Dadzie v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 1 G.L.R. 244 at p. 263, S.C.[p.420] there is this passage, "the essential elements of the offence,... should be communicated to an accused person in order that he might know of what he is accused." Lord Mansfield C.J. in R. v. Aylett (1785) 1 T.R. 63 at p. 69 stated that "It is necessary in every crime that the indictment charge it with certainty and precision to be understood by everybody: alleging all the requisites which constitute the offence."
In my view no specific offence was charged in this case and therefore this court has no jurisdiction to convict of any offence. See Commissioner of Police v. Wenyonu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 459, C.A.
Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the facts did not support a case of stealing even if it were held a proper charge had been laid. He urged that since the prosecution conceded that the appellant's accounts had been checked at the close of the working day on Saturday, 7 June 1969, and no loss had been detected, without proof tha
