DASI AKAKPO _ ANOR. v. BEN JOHNSON _ ANOR.
1999
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- BROBBEY, J.A. (PRESIDING)
- TWUMASI, J.A.
- ARYEETEY, J.A
Areas of Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
- Civil Procedure
1999
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
The case involved a plaintiff claiming to be a sitting tenant on land in Accra originally owned by the first appellant's father. Following disputes over the land's lease to the second appellant and demolition of structures on it, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff under the Rent Act. On appeal, it was determined that the Rent Act did not apply and the plaintiff was a licensee, not a statutory tenant. The ejection was deemed lawful, and the appellants' appeal succeeded.
JUDGMENT
BROBBEY, J.A.:
At the start of this litigation, there was only one plaintiff who shall be referred to hereafter as the respondent or first respondent. She claimed in the Circuit Court that she was a sitting tenant on a piece of land at Kantamanto in Accra. She avered that the land was actually owned by the father of the 1st appellant. It was he who allowed his mother to live there. After several years’ stay there, she learnt that the 1st appellant had leased the land to the 2nd appellant in 1989. According to her, the second appellant demolished structures, she and her husband had erected on the land as well as some of the wares they saw there. She therefore issued a writ claiming (a) a declaration that the 1st appellant was wrong in ejecting him without a court order. (b) a declaration that 1st appellant could not by-pass him to lease the same plot given to them by his father.
(c) Damages for unlawful ejectment.
(d) ¢2.5 Million damages for destruction of the respondents building.
(e) General damages for loss of income.
(f) Perpetual injunction to restrain respondents from demolishing her buildings.
After the trial judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. The appellants then appealed to this court against that judgment. Initially the appellants filed one ground of appeal. Later they filed eight additional grounds of appeal. The appeal was allowed on 28/10/99. We now proceed to give our reasons of all the grounds of appeal, the most fundamental ones, which undermined the judgment of the trial court, were grounds four and five which read as follows:—
“(4) The learned judge erred in determining the case under the Rent Act. and
(5) The trial judge erred in joining the P.W.1 as a co-plaintiff”
The trial judge proceeded with the entire case on basis that the statute applicable was the Rent Act (Act.220).
This is borne out by references in her judgment to the facts that the respondents were statutory tenants, six months statutory notice required to be given under Act. 220. to occupants of business premises, and section 17 (1) (h) of Act. 220.
Act.220, S.1 (2) (b) states categorically that the Act does not apply to vacant lands. It provides that:
“1(2) (b) This act shall not apply to any lease of any premises where such lease, whether entered into or renewed before, on or after the date of commencement of this act, was entered into or renewed as a lease of land upon which there were no premises at the time of the grant or