JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.
This is an appeal from the judgment dated 22 June 1964 of the learned local court magistrate in which he had come to a conclusion that a gift of the nature as the one before him was not irrevocable for good reasons.
The facts of this case are very simple. The plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter called the respondent) was the husband of the defendant-appellant (hereinafter called the appellant). He claims that because of his sickness—he was getting blind—and the fact that he valued the care of the appellant then his wife, he decided to make a gift of a portion of his farm to the appellant. This gift was acknowledged in customary form by the acceptance of sheep and drink which the appellant sent to the respondent to express her thanks for the gift of the farm to her.
But within about eight months after the respondent had given the portion of his farm as a gift to the appellant, the appellant sought dissolution of the marriage. She was not successful but owing to the persistence of the appellant the respondent was forced to seek a dissolution of the marriage. In his own words:
"During the dissolution of the marriage I warned the defendant in the presence of the meeting that since she has divorced me during my sickness I have revoked the gift I made to her and that she is forbidden from entering upon that property as from that date."
The issue for determination in this case is whether the gift made to the appellant by the respondent was a conditional gift which was revocable or an outright gift which is not revocable. Throughout the evidence of the respondent before the court below he referred to the transaction of a gift from him to the wife and it would appear [p.328] that it was so understood. Indeed under customary law the gift had been accepted as an outright gift by both parties by the offering and the acceptance of sheep and drink to acknowledge the gift. Again in the words of the respondent, "It was during the same month that the defendant brought drinks and sheep to acknowledge the gift of the farm I had made to her."
I am satisfied on the evidence before me that at the time that the respondent sent his junior uncle to the farm and allocated a portion of the farm to the appellant as a gift the respondent had it in mind to give that portion of the farm as an outright gift to the appellant. The question of revocation arose because the action of the appellant in seeking a dissolution of the marriage after the gift of t
