DANIEL OFORI v. ECOBANK GHANA LIMITED & ORS
2021
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- YEBOAH, CJ (PRESIDING)
- DOTSE, JSC
- BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC
- APPAU, JSC
- PWAMANG, JSC
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Evidence Law
- Corporate Law
- Banking and Finance Law
- Commercial Law
2021
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This Supreme Court ruling addresses Ecobank Ghana Limited’s application, made under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, to reopen Civil Appeal No. J4/11/2016 and adduce fresh evidence after the Court’s 25 July 2018 judgment reversed the Court of Appeal and High Court. The underlying dispute concerned Daniel Ofori’s sale of CAL Bank shares to William Oppong-Bio, executed through the Ghana Stock Exchange; the Bank of Ghana’s intervention led the SEC to hold the trade failed and to revert the shares to Ofori, a position the lower courts adopted. Ecobank argued post-judgment discoveries showed the shares remained registered to Ofori and that he received dividends from 2010–2019, rendering the appellate process unfair and warranting reopening. The majority, authored by Pwamang JSC and joined by Yeboah CJ, Baffoe-Bonnie JSC and Appau JSC, held that inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked where procedural rules provide a remedy; the proposed evidence was irrelevant to the appellate issue and did not meet Rule 76/Rule 54 thresholds, and collecting dividends pending appeal was lawful absent a stay. The application was dismissed as an abuse of process. Dotse JSC dissented, advocating reopening to address alleged fraud and fairness.
RULING
MAJORITY OPINION
PWAMANG JSC:-
My Lords, on 25th July, 2018 the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction as the final appellate court delivered judgment in Civil Appeal No. J4/11/2016 involving the parties to this application. By the said decision the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 6th June, 2013 which had confirmed judgment of the High Court in the case dated 16th September, 2011. The application before us prays the court to re-open that Civil Appeal No J4/11/2016 and also to grant leave to the 1st defendant/applicant herein, who was a respondent in the said appeal, to adduce further evidence before the court and for the appeal to be re-heard. The applicant contends that the new evidence it seeks leave to adduce if allowed will cause the court to vary its decision of 25th July, 2018. The application is being made on the inherent jurisdiction of the court.
As authority for praying the court to fall back on its inherent jurisdiction to re-open the appeal and receive further evidence the applicant referred to us the decision of the English House of Lords in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577 and another by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in R (on the application of Bancoult (No 2) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 35. At paragraph 20 of its statement of case the applicant submits as follows;
“20. The United Kingdom Supreme Court has subsequently followed the House in Pinochet. In R (on the application of Bancoult (No 2) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (supra), Lord Mance (with the concurrence of Lord Neuberger and Lord Clarke) stated emphatically that the failure by a party to disclose relevant evidence subjects the other party to an unfair procedure, and that if significant injustice was caused with no alternative effective remedy, then the court would exercise its power to re-open an appeal and permit fresh evidence…..” (emphasis supplied.)
The true position of the law as is affirmed in the above quoted statement is that a court, including a final court such as this court, may invoke its inherent jurisdiction where no alternative effective remedy has been provided for in the rules of procedure of the court. In Imbeah v Ababio [2000] SCGLR 259, the applicant therein, who was out of time as provided under the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I.16) r7(1) and (2) to repe