CITY EXPRESS LTD. v. MOHAMMED ABDULAI _ ANOR
2004
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- TWUMASI (PRESIDING)
- GBADEGBE, JA.
- PIESARE, J.A
Areas of Law
- Civil Procedure
- Evidence Law
- Employment Law
2004
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
In a judgment authored by Justice N.S. Gbadegbe of the Court of Appeal, Ghana, the court allowed an appeal arising from significant procedural and evidentiary irregularities in an unlawful dismissal action. After an application for directions on 9 May 1994 and a hearing on 12 May 1994, the trial judge set issues for trial but adjourned to 18 May 1994 for “further consideration.” Rather than trying the factual issues, the judge directed and immediately received legal arguments, without complying with Order 30 rule 5 or the prerequisites of Order 25. He then assessed damages based on extraneous, non-evidentiary material (including a termination letter and the parties’ ages), even attempting to take evidence mid-judgment. The Court of Appeal held the 18 May proceedings fundamentally flawed, declared the 18 October 1994 ruling a nullity, set aside both, and ordered a retrial according to law, invoking its powers under rule 8(8) of C.I. 19.
GBADEGBE J.A.
read the following judgment of the Court:
We have carefully scrutinized the record of appeal in the matter herein and have come to the view that the appeal succeeds for the following reasons.
In the first place, the court is of the view that it was wrong for the learned trial judge to have had the entire action determined by resort to legal arguments. We are of the view that there were several issues which arose on the pleadings as indeed is borne out by the application for directions filed on the 9th of May 1994. Most of the issues raised in the view of the court were matters that required the reception of evidence. In this regard we refer to issues 1, 2 and 3 as set out in the summons of directions by way of example. Further to this, the court is of the opinion that following the order made at the hearing of the summons for directions on the 12th of May, 1994, if there was any further matter or thing to be done in the action by way of directions, then the correct procedure was for the party who sought such an order to apply under order 30 rule 5 of the rules of the trial court for further directions.
We think that the proceedings of that day which appear at page 18 of the record of proceedings by which the learned trial judge purported to adjourn the matter for further consideration in the absence of anything in the record to clearly indicate that any of the issues set out before him required further directions was wrong. The position, which we have taken, of the proceedings of that day becomes clearer if the order as made by the learned trial judge is reproduced.
"By Court: The issues as filed by the plaintiffs are hereby set down for trial. Case stands adjourned to 18/5/94 for further consideration".
If it may be asked who raised any point or objection on the issues as filed which required further consideration? We are unable to accept the curse of conduct of the learned trial judge, which appears not to be reflected by the proceedings on which his subsequent order was based. In view of this we think that the proceedings of the 18th of May at which the direction regarding the taking of legal arguments was made and immediately proceeded with by the reception of arguments was wrong. Consequently, since the proceedings based thereon were procured following a non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Order 30 Rule 5 of the Rules of the trial court they are hereby set aside. Further, we are of the thinking that the proceedings su