JUDGMENT OF ABOAGYE J.
The plaintiff herein claims against the defendants N¢1,200.00 damages for an alleged assault on him on 23 January 1967, by Messrs. J. O. A. Lamptey and J. K. Commey both of whom were prison officers at the material time. The action was instituted against the first defendant, the Minister of Interior, as "the Minister responsible for Interior of which the Prison Services form part" and as the minister under whose control and direction all prison officers worked at the material time. The writ of summons was issued on 9 March 1970, and on 24 July 1970, after a summons for directions had been heard, upon the plaintiff's application, the second defendant, the Attorney-General was added to the Minister of Interior as second defendant because, according to the plaintiff, "the Attorney-General is a proper person to be added also as a person representing the Republic of Ghana."
Dr. Ekow Daniels, learned counsel for the plaintiff, had on 7 February 1970, served the Attorney-General with a notice of intention to commence an action against the Republic and a copy of the said notice had been filed in the registry of this court. In view of this it is hardly understandable why the writ was in the first instance issued against the Minister of Interior since section 10 (2) of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51), provides that, "the Attorney-General, or any officer authorised in that behalf by him, or any officer specified in that behalf under any law for the time being in force" is the proper person to be sued as the representative of the Republic. It was not averred by the plaintiff that the Minister of Interior had been authorised by the Attorney-General to represent him and paragraph 2 of the statement of claim shows clearly that the Minister of Interior was not sued as the representative of the Republic
In paragraph 10 of their statement of defence the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff's action is barred by the Public Officers Act, 1962 (Act 114). The preliminary point whether or not the plaintiff's action is statute-barred was therefore argued by counsel on 3 November 1970, [p.129] as the whole suit would be disposed of if it was ruled in favour of the defendants. Section 2 (1) (a) of Act 114 reads:
"2. (1) Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any enactment or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any allege
