JUDGMENT OF BROBBEY J.
On 26 October 1978 the defendant, Mrs. Alicia Bulley-Neequaye, obtained an adoption order from the High Court presided over by the late Griffiths-Randolph J. The precise wording of the order which was exhibited in the course of arguments of this application was this:
"Upon the reading of an application made by Alicia Edith Bulley-Neequaye, it is hereby ordered under and by virtue of the Adoption Act, 1962 (Act 104) and the relevant legislation made thereunder that the child Christiana Okailey Amina, a juvenile, be adopted by the said Alicia Edith Bulley-Neequaye as her lawful child for all purposes whatsoever, legal and equitable, and that the child be known as Christiana Okailey Amina Bulley-Neequaye according to the desire of the applicant herein expressed in the application, the mother of the child having consented to the adoption."
Barely two years later, the plaintiff herein, Mr. Eric Bulley-Neequaye, issued a writ applying for the adoption order to be set aside on grounds of irregularity. This ground was later amended to read that of nullity, that is that the adoption order should be set aside on the ground that that order was a nullity.
Miss Nketia who appeared for the defendant has raised a preliminary objection questioning the locus standi of the plaintiff to institute the present proceedings. In arguing the objection, Miss Nketia contended that the plaintiff was in no way connected with the adoption proceedings of 1978 which culminated in the order already read out. To that extent, the plaintiff was a total stranger to the adoption proceedings. She contended further that being a total stranger, the plaintiff could not by law apply to set aside the adoption order. She founded that submission on the authorities of Gbago v. Owusu [1972] 2 G.L.R. 252 at 253; Jacques v. Harrison (1883) 12 Q.B.D 136 and Akwei v. Akwei [1961] G.L.R. 212.
Replying, Mr. Goodhead, who appeared for the plaintiff, contended that the name "Bulley-Neequaye" is peculiarly associated with a special Ga family in Accra of which the plaintiff is a member and that is how the plaintiff acquired that name. The name "Bulley-Neequaye" given to the child after the adoption is traceable to the plaintiff 's family and that gave him the locus standi to bring the instant action. It was part of his argument that it takes two to have a child and since the adoption order was obtained during the subsistence of his marriage to the defendant, the defendant's child c
