BIMPONG v. THE REPUBLIC
January 23, 1990
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
- ADADE
- TAYLOR
- FRANCOIS
- WUAKU
- AMUA-SEKYI JJ.S.C
January 23, 1990
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
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JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
Taylor J.S.C. delivered the ruling of the court. The applicant herein was convicted at the circuit court for the offences of falsification of accounts and stealing on a number of counts which counsel for the Republic informs us were more than 40. He was sentenced in all to a total term of fourteen years' imprisonment with hard labour. His appeal to the High Court was dismissed and on 7 November 1988 his further appeal to the Court of Appeal was equally dismissed.
In the instant notice of motion filed in this court on 31 August 1989, a little over nine months after the dismissal by the Court of Appeal, he applies to us for an extension of time within which to appeal against his said conviction and sentence as so confirmed by the Court of Appeal. It is not necessary to consider the particulars of the offences nor his complaint set out in the grounds of appeal which he intends to urge on this court that his sentence of fourteen years was harsh. It is sufficient to observe that the applicant is an accountant by profession and that the value of the properties involved in the charges was put by Mrs. Anson, counsel for the Republic, at ¢2.6 million. It is also noteworthy that under section 296 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), the offences on which the applicant was arraigned carry terms of imprisonment not exceeding 25 years.
Be that as it may, the time for, and the manner of appealing to this court from a decision of the Court of Appeal in a criminal cause or [p.254] matter have been clearly set out in rule 31 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13). The relevant provisions are as follows:
"31. (1) Where the Republic or any person desires to appeal to the Court in a criminal cause or matter he shall give notice of a criminal appeal or notice of an application for leave to appeal within one month of the decision of the Court below.
(2) The period within which notice of a criminal appeal or notice of an application for leave to appeal may be given may be extended at any time by the Court or by the Court below on an application on notice.
(3) The notice of a criminal appeal or notice of an application for leave to appeal or notice of an application for extension of time within which such notice shall be given, as the case may be, shall be filed with the Registrar of the Court below.
(4) Where the Court below refuses to grant an applicat
AI Generated Summary
Taylor J.S.C., delivering the Supreme Court’s ruling, dismissed an application by an accountant convicted at the circuit court of multiple counts of falsification of accounts and stealing. After receiving a total sentence of fourteen years’ imprisonment with hard labour, and having his appeals dismissed by the High Court and, on 7 November 1988, by the Court of Appeal, the applicant sought, on 31 August 1989, an extension of time to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court held the motion incompetent because rules 31(3) and 34 of the Supreme Court Rules require such applications to be made first to the Court of Appeal and filed with its Registrar. It further held that section 3(2) of the Courts Act, as amended by P.N.D.C.L. 191, mandates leave where the Court of Appeal confirms a lower decision, and that rule 66(1) pertains only to civil actions. Counsel were Mrs. Anson for the Republic and Nana Akufo-Addo for the applicant.