April 30, 2013
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
In an original jurisdiction action before the Supreme Court of Ghana, a litigant challenged two provisions of the Supreme Court (Amendment) Rules, 2012 (C.I. 74): Rule 71B, captioned No Review, and part of Rule 69C(5), which directed the Court to sit including Saturdays, Sundays, and public holidays. Justice A. A. Benin, writing for the Court, held that Rule 71B does not abolish the constitutional review jurisdiction under Article 133(1); rather, it removes only the one-month time limit for filing review applications in presidential election petitions, a matter of practice and procedure within the Rules of Court Committees mandate under Article 64(3). By contrast, the Court concluded that Rule 69C(5), insofar as it requires sittings on public holidays, conflicts with sections 1, 4(1), and 6 of the Public Holidays Act, 2001 (Act 601), contravenes Article 93(2)s allocation of legislative power to Parliament, and exceeds the Committees authority. The Court emphasized interpretive principles that headings cannot override clear statutory text and relied on authorities distinguishing procedural rule-making from alteration of substantive rights.
J U D G M E N T
BENIN, J.S.C:-
The plaintiff brought this action invoking the original jurisdiction of this court. The reliefs sought are:
A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Articles 133, 157, 93(2) and 11 of the 1992 Constitution, Rule 71B and a part of Rule 69C(5) of the Supreme Court (Amendment) Rules, 2012 (C.I.74) are unconstitutional and must be declared null and void and of no effect.
Any consequential orders the Supreme Court may deem meet.
There are two clear and distinct reliefs. The first is by virtue of Rule 71B of C.I. 74 which amends part of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C. I. 16) pertaining to review. The second is by virtue of Rule 69C(5) which prescribes days of sitting in Presidential Election petition.
Rule 71B provides:
No Review
Rule 55 does not apply to decision of the Court in respect of a petition presented to challenge the election of a President.
The said Rule 55 provides that ‘An application for review shall be filed at the Registry of the Court not later than one month from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed.’
In construing a part of an enactment, the court must have regard to the entire legislation, and also put the part under consideration in context of the legislation. Rule 55 falls under Part V of C.I. 16 under the heading REVIEW. The said Part V sets out the practice and procedure regulating the exercise of the court’s review jurisdiction.
The scope of Rule 55 is restrictive in the context of the entire Part V, and the language is very clear and simple requiring no interpretation. It only sets the time frame within which an application may be brought for review. Counsel for the defendant got it partly right when he stated that “.........Rule 55 relates to the time for applying for review in the Supreme Court. This Rule has been revoked by Rule 71B........of C. I. 74.” Thus, the reality is that Rule 71B of C. I. 74 having abolished Rule 55 in relation to Presidential Election petitions, it means no more than that when it comes to Presidential Election petitions there is no time limit within which a party may apply for review. This may sound unusual but, nonetheless, it’s not illegal. Fixing of time within which a party may apply for review before the Supreme Court falls within the competence of the Rules of Court Committee under Article 64(3) as well as Article 133(1) of the Constitution.
To recap, the provision under consideration only sought to remove the time frame within wh