JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.
Bearing on this application for stay of execution, many learned and weighty points have been advanced. But, on reflection, it appears to me that the matter falls to be decided on a few comparatively simple grounds.
The order of which a stay is sought is that: the co-defendant-appellant-applicant (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) do pay into court the sum of ¢1,029,592 within ten days from the date of the judgment appealed against. Before I address myself to the merits or demerits of [p.425] this application for stay, I feel some explanation is due from me for ordering that the sum for which judgment was given was to be paid into court.
I have already expressed in the body of my judgment in this suit, the view that the Administration of Lands Acts, 1962 (Act 123), covers those cases in which land is already known to belong to a particular stool and that is why no machinery is provided under Act 123 for the resolution of rival claims. The provisions of Act 123, in my view, thus apply only where the land is undoubtedly land belonging to a particular stool. The State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), on the other hand, was fashioned to cater for all other cases where there may be conflicting claims because there is no certainty as to whether the ownership of land is in a stool or in an individual. The provisions of Act 123, were, therefore, not meant, and cannot apply, to compensation claimed and payable under Act 125. But it seems to me that, once it is determined that the land for which compensation is claimed is the land of a particular stool, the compensation which is payable is, as of that moment, affected by the provisions of Act 123; and the compensation must necessarily be paid into the stool lands account set up under section 18 of Act 123. It was the judgment in the present suit which decided that the compensation, the subject-matter of this suit, belonged to a particular stool—the Kumawu stool.
The only way in which this court could ensure that the amount for which judgment was given, which is part of a trust fund for the people or oman of Kumawu, would be paid and transferred into the stool lands account for the benefit of the people, was to order that the total amount for which judgment was obtained be paid into court by certain date. That there is jurisdiction in this court to give a judgment or make an order for payment of money into court within a stipulated time cannot be doubted; for by Order, 42, r. 4 of t
