ASHONG v. ASHONG

JUDGMENT OF AMISSAH J.A.

This is an appeal from a decision of Prempeh J., given on 1 March 1963 (unreported). It arises out of a summons issued by one Mrs. Juliana Ashong against her husband Mr. D. C. Ashong. By that summons she prayed the court that it should order her husband, who had wilfully neglected to provide reasonable maintenance for her, to make such payment to her for her maintenance as may be just. After reading the affidavit in the matter including one on the annual income and expenditure of Mr. Ashong and hearing the oral evidence of both parties, and arguments, the judge ruled that Mr. Ashong should pay the sum of £G115 representing maintenance for Mrs. Ashong at £G10 per month from the date of the filing of the petition until the date of the ruling and thereafter at the rate of £G20 per month. Against this ruling Mr. Ashong has now appealed. He shall hereafter be referred to as the appellant, the expression respondent being reserved for his wife, Mrs. Ashong.

Several grounds of appeal were filed during the pendency of this appeal. At the hearing, counsel for the appellant asked for leave to argue the supplementary grounds filed on 26 November 1966. Leave was granted and his arguments were confined to those three supplementary grounds. The first of these grounds, which was by far the most vigorously contested was that the learned trial judge had no [p.137] jurisdiction to hear an application based on section 23 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (14 Geo.6,c.25). To put the argument briefly, it was contended for the appellant that the proceedings before the High Court were brought under section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, but that this Act could only apply within the jurisdiction of Ghana if made to do so by section 17 of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.). Although the Ordinance itself has been repealed, the section has been saved by each new enactment on the structure and jurisdiction of the courts in the country, the latest saving provision being paragraph 93 of the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84). The construction of the relevant part of section 17 of the Ordinance, therefore, is of the greatest importance on this question. It reads as follows:

"The jurisdiction hereby conferred upon the Supreme Court in Probate, Divorce and Matrimonial Causes and proceedings may, subject to this Ordinance and to Rules of Court, be exercised by the Supreme Court in conformity with the law and practice for the time being i