JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.
The appellant pleaded guilty to a count of assault and of causing damage to property contrary to sections 84 and 172 respectively of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), before the District Court Grade II, Bekwai. He was accordingly convicted by the trial magistrate, who cautioned and discharged the appellant on the first count and imposed a fine of N¢400.00 or in default 24 months' imprisonment as regards the second count. It is against this sentence on the second count that the appellant now appeals.
The facts are not relevant, save that the articles which the appellant damaged were personal articles of clothing and household gear of the complainant, and in all valued at N¢36.25. These articles belonged to a sister of the appellant and were damaged in a fracas in the house after the accused had been drinking at a funeral. Further the appellant admitted one previous conviction for causing harm, for which he was sentenced to twelve month's imprisonment with hard labour.
From the facts and the previous record as given, the magistrate thought the appellant was a nuisance to the community, and decided to apply the Courts Decree, 1966 (N. L. C. D. 84), para. 51 (3), which empowers a district court to impose twice its maximum punishment where increased [p.74] punishment may be imposed upon a person previously convicted of a crime. It was as a result of this view that the magistrate imposed what obviously is a harsh sentence of N¢400.00 or 24 months' imprisonment with hard labour. In this case the magistrate had stated that the appellant was a trouble maker "in a decent society, and he is to be kept . . . in the prison for some time." It is obvious that he intended the appellant to be kept in prison. Why then the option of a fine of as much as N¢400.00 against a total value of only N¢36.25 of articles damaged? If it is thought that the previous record of an accused is unsavoury, and that a term of imprisonment in the circumstances would be the best punishment, the court ought to be realistic and straight way mete out a term of imprisonment.
In my opinion, therefore, where the court's primary object is to keep the accused in prison it is improper to impose so huge a fine as an option, with the obvious effect that the accused will find it far beyond his means and thereby achieve the desired result of the accused serving a term of imprisonment.
On the facts of this case, one may well think an option of a fine would meet the case; bec
