JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.
[His lordship reviewed the facts as set out in the headnote and continued:]
One of the appellant's main grounds of complaint is that at the close of the case for the prosecution a prima facie case had not been made out against him and that he ought not to have been called upon to put up a defence. Mr. Hayfron-Benjamin, counsel for the Republic, has objected to this ground of appeal. According to him there is no right of appeal against a decision overruling a submission of no case, the choices open to an accused person whose submission is overruled being those set out in the well-known judgment of Kingdon C.J. in R. v. Ajani (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 3 at p. 7 which I quote:
"(a) If at the close of the case for the prosecution his Counsel, if he was represented, made no submission, he can be properly convicted upon evidence subsequently given. and (b) If at the close of the case for the prosecution, he, being unrepresented and probably completely ignorant of procedure, made no submission, he can be properly convicted upon evidence subsequently given. and (c) If at the close of the case for the prosecution he or his counsel made a submission which was wrongly overruled then, if either he or his Counsel took any part in the subsequent proceedings, an appeal against a conviction resulting from those proceedings will fail. But (d) If at the close of the case for the prosecution he or his counsel made a submission, which was wrongly overruled, and then refused to take any part in the subsequent proceedings, he will be 'quite safe,' i.e. apparently certain to get a possible conviction quashed on appeal."
It will be observed that the right to appeal is not mentioned. This means that in 1936 there was probably no right of appeal against a decision overruling a submission of no case, but it does not follow that there is still no such right. In the case of a district court, section 19 (4) of' the Courts Act. 1971 (Act 372), provides:
"(4) A person aggrieved by any interlocutory order or decision made or given by a District Court may appeal against it to the High Court with the leave of the District Court or of the High Court and the High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any such appeal."
This provision in our law came up for consideration in Yevu v. The Republic [1972] 2 G.L.R. 148 and Atisu v. The Republic [1974] 1 G.L.R. 53, to which counsel referred. In the former case, Francois J. doubted whether there was a right