AKAINYAH AND ANOTHER v. THE REPUBLIC

JUDGMENT OF APALOO J.A.

Apaloo J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. As a result of adverse findings made against them by the Ollennu Commission appointed under the Corrupt Practices (Prevention) Act, 1964 (Act 230), (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the two appellants were prosecuted on various counts of offering to give bribe to influence a public officer, accepting bribe to influence a public officer, conspiracy to commit extortion and corruption. Availing himself of the power conferred on him by subsection (1) of section 4 of the Act, the Attorney-General preferred these charges against the appellants on the basis of the findings made against them by the commission.

In due course, the charges came an for hearing before Azu Crabbe J.A., sitting as an additional judge in the High Court. The [p.552] appellants requested the court to invoke the Powers conferred on it by subsection (2) of section 6 of the Act and allow them to call evidence. The court acceded to this request and both appellants then gave evidence on their own behalves. The second appellant's evidence was a mere repetition of the facts on which the commission's adverse findings against him were based and the learned trial judge considered it to be a plea in mitigation. The first appellant however contested the facts and denied the evidence of the witnesses on which the adverse findings against her were grounded. The learned trial judge expressed disbelief in the first appellant's evidence and in the end, felt himself unable to differ from the learned commissioner on the facts. Holding that the facts supported the charges, the learned judge proceeded to convict each appellant of the counts on which she or he was charged and imposed on them various terms of imprisonment.

Both appellants say that the convictions are wrong and hence this appeal. Although the appellants diverged on the facts and on some of the grounds on which they contest their conviction, they share a common ground of appeal, namely, that the Corrupt Practices (Prevention) Act, 1964, was wholly invalid inasmuch as it violated the 1960 Constitution of Ghana.

The argument against the validity of the Act was not made before us for the first time. The Act was impugned both before the learned commissioner and the learned trial judge on grounds which are wholly dissimilar. Neither was impressed by the argument put forward and both declined to say that the Act was invalid. As neither the commissioner nor the learned trial