2018
SUPREME COURT
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Gbadegbe JSC, writing for a panel comprising Adinyira JSC (Presiding), Dotse JSC, Baffoe-Bonnie JSC and Benin JSC, resolved a dispute over land in Ayigya by affirming the Court of Appeal. Both parties claimed title through the Hia-Topre stool: the plaintiff asserted a 1990s grant later formalized by a conveyance and relied on a District Court, Kumasi conviction of the 1st defendant for obstruction. The defendants traced their title to their late father Mohammed Suley’s 15 January 1970 allocation and long possession, including a residence and property rates. Applying appellate caution, the Supreme Court found the trial judge erred by elevating conveyance and a criminal conviction over clear evidence of prior grant and possession. Invoking Amuzu v Oklika, it held the plaintiff’s subsequent grant void, rejected issue estoppel, clarified writing is not a sine qua non to customary grants, and upheld defendants’ capacity under PNDC Law 112 and the finality aims of CI 47.
The judgment of the Court was read by Gbadegbe, JSC as follows:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal which reversed the decision of the trial Circuit Court in the action herein. By that decision, the Court of Appeal accepted the case of the Defendants/Appellant/Respondents (Defendants) and rejected that of the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant (Plaintiff). As the two lower courts differ in their resolution of the disputed question of fact which turned on the pleadings namely which of the contending parties owns the disputed land, our task in the matter herein is to determine after a careful consideration of the evidence contained in the record of appeal, which of the two decisions truly reflects the effect of the evidence. As there is a conflict of opinion between the trial court and the Court of Appeal, we have to bear in mind that as the trial court was the tribunal of fact, we have to scrutinize the judgment to determine if the conclusion reached on all the evidence was open to the learned trial judge. If on the evidence, the decision reached by the learned trial judge was supported by the evidence, then the Court of Appeal was not entitled to reverse it even if they would have reached a different conclusion on the disputed facts. The Court of Appeal can only interfere when satisfied after a consideration of all the evidence that learned the trial judge did not properly exercise his discretion resulting in the decision being perverse and or unreasonable. It is important that appellate judges demonstrate a slowness in interfering with decisions of trial courts when such decisions are supported by the evidence. The attitude of appellate courts is admirably expressed in the judgment of Kludze JSC (as he then was) in the case of In Re Okine (Dec’d) [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 582 at 607 when he observed as follows:
“In the Court of Appeal, and before us, it was argued that we must not disturb the finding of fact made by the trial judge unless they are wholly unsupported by the evidence. I accept that as a sound proposition of law. There is a long line of cases to the effect that even if the appellate court would have come to a different conclusion, it should not disturb the conclusion reached by the trial court. This is because the trial court is presumed to have made the correct findings…………………… In other words, where the evidence can reasonably support the conclusions of the trial judge, the appellate judges should not order a reversal just