ADE YAYA SHERIF v. KOFI DUGBAVIE & 4 ORS

IRIS MAY BROWN {MRS} J. Plaintiff/Appellant in this case is appealing against an award of compensation made in his favour by the court below for the use of his land by the defendant.

Plaintiff’s land plot number 110 registered in 1988 shares a boundary with Defendant’s land plot number 111.

It is Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant insists on using a portion of Plaintiffs land as thoroughfare although an alternative route is available.

Plaintiff built a wall across this area which was broken down by the Defendant.

A writ filed by the Plaintiff claimed; 1. special damages for “breaking and destroying Plaintiff’s wall” 2. general damages for trespass.

3. perpetual injunction restraining defendants from further interference 4. damages for assault.

During the trial, claims 1 and 4, for special damages for assault and for the destruction of the wall, the subject matter of earlier criminal proceedings, were left out because as stated in the address of counsel for the defendant/respondents the defendants in a criminal prosecution “had been severally convicted and fined”. The court was left to deal with issues 2 and 3 being claims for perpetual injunction and for general damages for trespass.

At the end of the trial the court found that the land trespassed on belonged to Plaintiff but that there was no alternative way available to the Defendant.

The Court declared that the Defendant could not use the land without compensating the Plaintiff.

It therefore ordered the defendant to pay compensation of ¢5 million.

Plaintiff has appealed on the basis that the award of compensation was an error in law because it was an award of a relief not asked for.

Secondly the finding by the court that no alternative route was available was also erroneous.

The Plaintiff is asking this court to set the award aside and give judgment on the claims sought by him at the lower court, and those are an award of damages and perpetual restraint of the defendant from using the land.

The Defendants did not dispute the ownership of the land trespassed on.

They were merely contending that that the Plaintiff had no right to block the driveway because it was the only access to their home and they had a right of way.

There were diverse testimonies on the availability of alternative routes.

The first witness on record admitted there were lanes and access routes, but that the Defendant had no direct access to the two roads.

In his opinion that was a matter of negotiations between the