ACQUAH v. OMAN GHANA TRUST HOLDINGS LTD.
November 27, 1984
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- APALOO C.J.
- FRANCOIS
- ABBAN JJ.A
Areas of Law
- Property and Real Estate Law
- Evidence Law
- Civil Procedure
- Contract Law
November 27, 1984
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
This appeal arose from a landlords suit for possession and mesne profits after a two-year lease of residential premises at MacCarthy Hill, Accra, expired on 30 October 1979 and the tenant company held over. The appellant, managing director of Pampas Ltd., claimed he needed the only house he owned for his family, having lived above his factory where his children were exposed to machinery. The respondent resisted, alleging an oral promise to sell and a2352,000 in improvements. The High Court (Anterkyi J.) denied possession, upheld the counterclaim, and set off a pecuniary award and costs against future rent, effectively extending occupancy. On appeal, Apaloo C.J. held the counterclaim unproven and barred by the leases written-consent covenant and the principle against profiting from ones own wrong; found bona fide need and greater hardship to the landlord under Act 220; ordered immediate possession; awarded mesne profits equating to rent; and reversed the excessive costs, granting costs to the appellant.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
The appellant is the managing director of a limited liability company, called Pampas. He is the owner of a residential premises at MacCarthy Hill, off the Winneba Road, Accra. It is No 45. By an agreement dated 10 March 1978, he granted a lease of that premises to the respondent, also a limited liability company, with its registered office at North Labone, Accra. I shall hereafter refer to it as the company. The lease was for a period of two years certain from 30 October 1977. There was an option to renew on specified condition. The rent reserved by the lease was ¢24,000 per annum.
It is common ground that the company did not exercise the option to renew. Accordingly, the lease determined by effluxion of time on 30 October 1979. Before the term came to an end, the appellant by a letter dated 3 August 1979 reminded the company that as they had not exercised the option to renew, the contractual tenancy would come to an end on 30 October 1979 and he would resume possession of the premises on that day. He did not say in that letter what use he intended to make of the premises if he regained possession. As it turned out, he was minded of entering into occupation himself and using it as a dwelling-house for himself and family. The company did not yield up possession at the end of the lease. They held over and refused to leave. They then became statutory tenants under section 36 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220). The appellant was thus disabled from recovering possession of his premises without the aid of the court.
On 20 May 1981 he issued out of the High Court, a writ in which he sought an order for possession. As the contractual term had expired nearly two years earlier, no rents were exigible under the lease. But, as however, the company held over and remained in possession nevertheless, the appellant also sought against them an order for the payment of mesne profits from 1 November 1979 to the date of judgment.
In so far as it is possible to make out from the company’s prolix statement of defence, they resisted the order for possession because they say the appellant, by his conduct, led them to believe that he would sell the demised premises to them and in reliance on this conduct as well as other assurances, expended the sum of ¢352,000 in making improvements to the premises. While not counterclaiming for specific performance of the said promise to sell, they counterclaimed for the said sum of ¢352,000. The other legal answer they