JUDGMENT OF LAMPTEY J.A.
Lamptey J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. Early in December 1985 in the city of Cape Coast the first defendant, C. K. Budgyei, approached the plaintiff-appellant, Gustav Ackumey (hereinafter called the plaintiff), and asked for financial assistance to the tune of ¢75,000. The interest charged was ¢15,000. The plaintiff agreed to give the first defendant the whole amount. The terms and conditions were embodied in a document which the first defendant executed in favour of and for the benefit and purposes of the plaintiff. On receipt of the document the plaintiff gave the first defendant the financial assistance of ¢75,000. The first defendant repaid ¢30,000 and thereafter failed and/or was unable to make further repayments. The plaintiff took out a writ of summons against the first defendant and against one F. K. Kumah as the second defendant. The second defendant was sued because on the face of the document evidencing the loan transaction he stood as guarantor for the first defendant. In his defence the second defendant denied guaranteeing the repayment of the debt. Briefly put, he said that he was a "witness" to the loan transaction. He therefore resisted the claim of the plaintiff.
The circuit court judge at Cape Coast heard the case on the merits. The first defendant did not enter appearance, even though he was [p.285] served with the writ of summons. He did not take any part in the trial. The second defendant, however, fought and defended the action brought against him. The learned circuit court judge dismissed the plaintiff ’s action and entered judgment for the second defendant. The plaintiff, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, appealed to this court on a number of grounds.
The first ground of appeal argued by learned counsel for the plaintiff was ground (b) of the original grounds of appeal. This ground was expressed as follows:
"(b) The trail judge having come to the conclusion that the second defendant, F. K. Kumah . . . signed the promissory note as a guarantor ought to have found him liable as a guarantor; for the word 'guarantor' should have been given its ordinary meaning having regard to the said promissory note."
In arguing that ground of appeal, learned counsel for the plaintiff, Mrs. Evans-Quayson, drew the court's attention to the fact that one of the issues set down for trial in the lower court was whether or not the word “guarantor” appearing on the face of the d
