JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.
The application now before this court is made under rules 2 and 3 of Order 25 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The defendant-applicant (hereafter referred to as the defendant) is seeking an order to dismiss the plaintiff's action herein by reason of the fact that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and is an abuse of the process of the court on the following grounds:
"(1) That the words contained in the first sentence of the words complained of: (a) are under Ghanaian law not actionable per se without proof of special damage, which is not alleged in the statement of claim, or (b) are in any case incapable both under Ghanaian law and under Swiss law of bearing the meanings relied upon in the statement of claim, namely, that the plaintiff is a man without morals, and that he is unfit for the various offices specified in paragraph (9) of the statement of claim, or both.
(2) That the words contained in the second and third sentences of the words complained of: (a) are incapable of any defamatory meaning under Ghanaian law; or (b) could not constitute a criminal offence and therefore cannot be justifiable under the law of Switzerland; or (c) are in any event incapable both under Ghanaian law and under Swiss law of bearing the meanings relied upon in the statement of claim that the plaintiff carries on the business of an illicit diamond dealer with one Adolf Pluss, or that he is unfit for the various offices specified in paragraph (9) of the statement of claim."
Counsel for the defendant contended that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because it discloses no cause of action. The action of the plaintiff was in slander and the words complained of were set out in paragraph (4) of the statement of claim attached to the summons. The words complained of could safely be divided into two parts, contended counsel for the defendant, for the purposes of the application before the court.
[p.1072]
The first part concerned the Vice-Chairman of the National Liberation Council, Mr. Harlley, that he spent the night with his girl friend. This distinction was being made by counsel for the defendant because in his view the second sentence would not be defamatory by any stretch of the imagination, and he urged the court to ignore those words. The second leg was constituted by the words, "Perhaps, John Harlley will go to supervise his diamond business in England with his friend Adolf Pluss."
