ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE v. AMANKWATIA-ANTO AND ANOTHER

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.

The co-defendant on 31 August 1968, obtained judgment against the plaintiffs, an insurance company, for the sum of N¢1,625.00 inclusive of N¢250.00 costs.

The plaintiff say that they find it difficult to make payment to the co-defendant unless, according to them, the co-defendant produces a tax clearance certificate which in their view, is necessary having regard to the provisions of paragraph 81A (3) of the Income Tax Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D.78), as inserted by paragraph 4 (1) (a) of the Income Tax (Amendment) Decree 1968 (N.L.C.D. 265). The plaintiffs therefore brought this application for a stay of execution until the said tax clearance certificate was produced by the co-defendant.

[p.1003]

The determination of this application calls for the construction of N.L.C.D. 78, paragraph 81A (3) as inserted by N.L.C.D. 265. The said paragraph provides as follows:

"81A. (3) No insurance company shall pay any money in respect of any claim made under any policy issued by that company unless the person to whom the money is payable under the policy produces to the company a tax clearance certificate issued in respect of himself and valid for the year of assessment in which the money is to be paid."

It is an elementary principle of construction of enactments that the words used therein must be given their ordinary meaning, and it is only when the words so used are not clear that resort is made to the rules governing interpretation of enactments, and Decrees of the National Liberation Council in my view come under the rubric of enactments or statutes.

In the case of R. v. Ramsgate (Inhabitants) (1827) 6 B. & C. 712 at p. 715 Bayley J. said: "It is very desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of an Act of Parliament, giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are placed." In 1932 Lord Warrington of Clyffe approved of this principle in Barrell v. Fordree [1932] A.C. 676 at 682, H.L. when he stated, "the safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases."

I propose, therefore, in my attempt at construing N.L.C.D. 78, para. 81A (3), as inserted by paragraph 4 (1) (a) of N.L.C.D. 265, to adopt the sensible and meaningful suggestion of Lord Warrington of Clyffe.

It is to be observed that a contract of insurance is an agreement between the insurance comp