REPUBLIC v. GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE APPIAH AND OTHERS
July 8, 1981
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
- EDUSEI
- EDWARD WIREDU JJ.A.
- ABBAN J
Areas of Law
- Administrative Law
- Civil Procedure
- Employment Law
July 8, 1981
COURT OF APPEAL
GHANA
CORAM
AI Generated Summary
Abban J., delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, addressed an appeal by employees of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC) who had sought leave, by ex parte motion, to apply for certiorari to quash government directives purporting to dismiss them and to restrain the Government from usurping the corporations statutory disciplinary functions. The High Court (Cecilia Koranteng-Addow J.) refused leave, reasoning that no decision existed for certiorari and that section 13 of the State Proceedings Act barred injunctions against the Republic. The Court of Appeal held that directives of such impact must emanate from decision-making and are amenable to certiorari, and that section 13 bars only ordinary equitable injunctions, not an injunction in the nature of quo warranto, which may be tacked to certiorari. Masterservant dismissal precedents were distinguished. Finding a prima facie case, the court allowed the appeal, granted leave for certiorari and quo warranto relief, and remitted the matter for substantive hearing under Order 59.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.
Abban J. delivered the judgment of the court. The appeal is from the ruling of Cecilia Koranteng-Addow J., sitting at the High Court, Accra. The appellants, in an ex parte motion, sought leave to issue an order of certiorari to quash what was described as directives issued by the government purporting to dismiss the appellants from the employment of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation. They also asked for an injunction directed against the Attorney-General restraining the government from assuming or usurping the functions of Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation by purporting to exercise the right of dismissing the appellants who are the employees of Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation. The third remedy was for an injunction to be directed against the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation restraining the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation from taking any steps against the appellants on the basis of the purported directives.
The application named the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation as the first respondent and the Attorney-General as the second respondent and they will hereafter be referred to as such. After hearing counsel for the appellants, the learned High Court judge refused to grant the appellants leave. Hence this appeal.
Seven grounds of appeal were filed and argued together. The grounds substantially, complained that the learned judge erred in refusing to grant leave and that she was wrong in law in holding that the government was not required to act judicially in giving directives to the management of the first respondent to dismiss the appellants. They also contended that the learned judge erred in applying the provisions of section 13 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51).
We must observe that the learned High Court judge in her ruling appeared to have treated the ex parte motion as if she was dealing with the substantive motion. However, because of the view we have taken of this matter, we will confine ourselves to the issue as to whether there was a prima facie case which entitled the appellants to be granted leave.
[p.739]
The learned judge's refusal to grant leave was based on about three main grounds. The certiorari was directed against the second respondent and the learned judge held that it would not lie since the part played by the government was not "tantamount to a decision-making" which could have formed "the subject-matter of investigation and therefore be quashable."
With respect to the