As the first defendant's defence raised a number of legal issues, the same were, upon an application brought by his counsel, set down for argument. The first issue which reads thus:
"Whether or not the proceedings in an inquiry before the Ombudsman and the various exhibits tendered at the said inquiry and as referred to in paragraphs 13-16 of the statement of claim are not absolutely privileged by virtue of section 15(31) of the Ombudsman Act, 1980 (Act 400)," raises no problems whatsoever. Both counsel are agreed that such material are absolutely privileged.
The next question is also formulated thus: "That the said proceedings at the said inquiry cannot ground an action for defamation." I should think this is a correct statement of the law, for the simple reason that if they are absolutely privileged they cannot form the basis of or ground for any action for defamation.
In my view therefore, the plaintiff cannot use the information he collected or gathered at the Ombudsman to found any action in defamation. More importantly by the relevant paragraph (14) of his statement of claim he confesses it was at the hearing before the Ombudsman that he saw the minutes produced by the first defendant when submitting their case. The defendant cannot use this material to found an action in defamation because it is an absolutely privileged material. It would [p.167] seem to me therefore that at the hearing of the substantive suit the plaintiff can never be heard to repeat orally or produce the minutes of the Interim Management Committee (I.M.C.) which forms the basis of his claim and which he procured at the hearing before the Ombudsman. Put in other words, because he came by those documents following the trial at the Ombudsman, they never be used to found the plaintiff’s action. This should answer the third issue as raised in the motion.
Finally, the communications between the first defendant and the other members of the I.M.C. about the conduct of the plaintiff would enjoy absolute privilege in so far as they were made available at the hearing before the Ombudsman. Otherwise, the actual communication itself produced at the material time at the I.M.C. meeting would enjoy qualified not absolute privilege if made outside the proceedings before the Ombudsman: see the case of Adapoe v. Pospisil [1974] 2 G.L.R. 327 relied on by the defendant’s counsel. It would seem to me therefore that the answers to these legal issues will at this stage dispose of this case. This
